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Whenever a witness is disqualified from testifying on behalf of a colleague because he is married to the witness' relative, if that relative's wife dies, even if she left him sons, he is considered to have been released from any connection and is acceptable as a witness.

When a person knew of evidence concerning a colleague before he became his son-in-law, and then became his son-in-law, he is not acceptable. The same law applies if a person was in control of his senses and then became a deaf-mute, was able to see and became blind - even though he is aware of the measure of land concerning which he testifies and can define its boundaries, or was intellectually and emotionally sound and then lost control of his faculties.
If, by contrast, a person knew of evidence concerning a colleague before he became his son-in-law, became his son-in-law, and then that colleague's daughter died, the witness is acceptable. Similar laws apply if a person was in control of his senses, became a deaf-mute, and then regained control of his senses, was intellectually and emotionally sound, lost control of his faculties, and then regained control of them, or was able to see, became blind, and then regained his sight.
The general principle is: Whenever a person is an acceptable witness at the initial and the final stages, he is acceptable even though in the interim, he was not acceptable as a witness. If, however, initially he is unacceptable, even though ultimately, he would be acceptable, he is disqualified. Therefore when a person is aware of evidence as a child, it is of no consequence for him to testify with regard to it when he attains majority.

There are matters concerning which we rely on the testimony which a person gives after he attains majority with regard to events that he observed when he was a child. The rationale is that these are matters of Rabbinical origin. The matters are as follows; a person's word is accepted when he states: a) "This is the signature of my father," "...my teacher," "...or my brother," the rationale is that the validation of legal documents is a Rabbinic requirement;
b) "I remember that when so-and-so was married, they performed the customs performed for a virgin"; since most women marry when virgins and a ketubah is a Rabbinic institution;
c) "This place is a beit hapras," for the ritual impurity associated with such a place is a Rabbinic safeguard;
d) "We would proceed until this point on the Sabbath," because the restriction of the Sabbath limits until only 2000 cubits is a Rabbinic restriction;
e) "So-and-so would leave school to immerse himself in a mikveh and eat terumah in the evening" or "he would receive a portion of terumah with us;"
f) "We would bring challah and presents of meat to so-and-so, the priest"; this applies when the presents were sent with the person himself;
g) "My father told me, 'This family is acceptable; this family is not acceptable";
h) "We ate from the fruit-barrel brought by the brothers of so-and-so to inform others that their brother, so-and-so, married a woman that was not appropriate for him.
All of the latter four points involve establishing a person as a priest to enable him to partake of terumah that is separated at present because of Rabbinic decree or to prevent him from partaking of it.

The leniency granted in all these situations to accept the testimony of a person who reached majority with regard to what he knew when he was a minor is not granted when a gentile or a servant witnessed such matters and gave such testimony after he converted and was freed.

If, before becoming a robber, a person knew of evidence concerning a colleague and recorded that evidence in a legal document and then became a robber, he cannot testify with regard to his signature. If, however, his signature to the legal document was validated in court before he became a robber, the legal document is acceptable.
Similarly, if a witness becomes a person's son-in-law, he may not testify concerning his signature on a legal document involving his father-in-law. Others, however, may testify concerning the son-in-law's signature. Even though the document is not validated by the court until after the witness becomes a person's son-in-law, it is acceptable. The disqualification of a witness because of a transgression is not the same as the disqualification of a witness because of a family connection, for a person disqualified because of a transgression is suspected of forging the document.

When a legal document has only two witnesses signed upon it and they are related to each other or one of them is disqualified because of a transgression, even if the document was transferred in the presence of acceptable witnesses, it is worthless, like a shard, because of the invalid signatures inside it.

The following rule applies when a person composes one legal document including testimony that he is granting all of his property to two people and the witnesses to the document are related to one of the recipients of the present, but not related to the other. The document is not acceptable, because it is one statement of testimony.
If, however, he writes in one legal document that he is giving this-and-this courtyard to Reuven and this-and-this field to Shimon, and the witnesses are related to one, but not to the other, the present given to the recipient to whom the witnesses are not related is binding. Even though the two statements are included in one legal document, they are considered as separate testimonies. To what can the matter be compared to a person who says: "Serve as witnesses that I gave Reuven this-and-this, that I gave Shimon this-and-this, and that I borrowed such-and-such from Levi." Although they were all included in the same legal document and there is only one person transferring the property, they are considered as three distinct statements.