הלכות רוצח ושמירת הנפש

But a person who hires a murderer to kill a colleague, one who sends his servants and they kill him, one who binds a colleague and leaves him before a lion or the like and the beast kills him, and a person who commits suicide are all considered to be shedders of blood; the sin of bloodshed is upon their hands, and they are liable for death at the hands of God. They are not, however, liable for execution by the court.

Which source indicates that this is the law? Genesis 9:6 states: "When a person sheds the blood of a man, by a man his blood shall be shed." This refers to a person who kills a colleague by himself, without employing an agent.
The verse continues: "Of the blood of your own lives I will demand an account." This refers to a person who commits suicide.⁶
"From the hand of every wild beast will I demand an account" Ibid. 9:5 This refers to a person who places a person before a wild beast so that he will devour him.
"From the hand of a man, from the hand of one's brother, will I demand an account for the soul of a man" ibid.. This refers to a person who hires others to kill a colleague. In all of the three last instances, the verse uses the expression "will I demand an account," indicating that their judgment is in heaven's hands.

When a Jewish king desires to slay any of these murderers and the like - who are not liable for execution by the court - by virtue of his regal authority, in order to perfect society, he has the license.
Similarly, if the court desires to execute them as a result of a immediate fiat, because this was required at the time, they have the license to do as they see fit.

If the king did not execute them, nor did the court deem the time as such to require strengthening the strictures against murder, it should nevertheless have the murderer beaten with severe blows - so that he is on the verge of death - and imprisoned, deprived and afflicted with all types of discomfort in order to strike fear and awe into the hearts of other wicked men, so that this death should not be a stumbling block and a snag for them, causing them to say: "Let me arrange to have my enemies killed the way so-and-so did, and I will not suffer the consequences."

Whether a person kills an adult or an infant that is one day old, a male or a female, he should be executed if he killed him intentionally, or exiled if he killed him unintentionally.
With regard to an infant, the above applies provided it was born after a full term pregnancy. If, however, it was born before nine months passed, it is considered to be an inviable birth until it lives for 30 days. If it is killed within those 30 days, the killer should not be executed.

Whether a person kills a healthy person, a sick person who is on the verge of dying, or even a person in his actual death throes, the killer should be executed. If, however, one kills a person in his death throes because of wounds inflicted upon him by others - i.e., he was stricken until he was on the verge of death, and he is in his death throes, the killer should not be executed by the court.

When, by contrast, a person is considered trefah,even though he eats, drinks and walks in the market place, one is not held liable by an earthly court for killing him.
Every person is presumed to be physically sound, and a person who kills him should be executed unless it is certainly known that he is a trefah, and the physicians say that his infirmity does not have any remedy for humans and it will surely cause his death, if no other factor does first.

When a person who is a trefah kills another man, he should be killed, as reflected by Deuteronomy 19:19, which states: "And you shall destroy the evil from among your midst."
When does this apply? When he committed the murder in the presence of a court. If, however, he committed the murder in the presence of witnesses, he is not liable. The rationale is that the witnesses may be disqualified through hazamah. And if they are disqualified through hazamah, they will not be punished by execution, for they intended merely to have a person who was trefah executed. And whenever the laws of hazamah cannot be applied to testimony, it is not considered to be valid testimony in capital cases.

At first, a person who killed a resident alien should not be executed by the court, as implied by Exodus 21:14, which introduces the laws regarding the punishment for murder, by stating: "When a man acts intentionally against his colleague, killing him...." Needless to say, this ruling applies with regard to a gentile.
Whether a person kills his own Canaanite servant or a servant belonging to someone else, he should be executed. For a servant has accepted the yoke of mitzvot and has been added to "the heritage of God."

What is the difference between killing one's own Canaanite servant and a servant belonging to someone else? With regard to one's own servant, one has the right to strike him. Thus, if one strikes him with a blow that is sufficient to cause death, and he is on the verge of dying, but survives for 24 hours and dies afterwards, the owner should not be executed, although the servant died because of the blow, as Exodus 21:21 states: "But if he survives for a day or two, he shall not be avenged, for he is his property."
What is the intent of the phrase "for a day or two"? A day that is like two days - i.e., a full 24-hour cycle.

Different rules apply when, by contrast, one strikes a Canaanite servant who belongs to another person. If one strikes him with a blow sufficient to kill, one may be executed for killing him, as one would be executed for killing any free Jew, even if he does not die because of the blow until several days have passed.

It appears to me that when a person strikes his servant with a knife, a sword, a stone, a fist or the like, and it was assessed that he would die, and he did die, the leniency granted if the servant survives more than 24 hours does not apply. Instead, even if the servant dies a year later, the owner should be executed because of the servant's death.
To underscore this point, Exodus 21:20 mentions striking the servant "with a rod." For the Torah has granted the owner permission to beat his servant only with a rod, a staff, a strap or the like, and he may not strike him with murderous blows.

The following rules apply when a person sells his servant and stipulates that the servant must continue to serve him for 30 days - and in those 30 days, either the seller or the purchaser strikes the servant - the leniency granted if the servant survives more than 24 hours does not apply, neither to the seller nor to the purchaser, and the killer should be executed.
The rationale is that the servant no longer is the personal "property" of the seller, nor has he entered the domain of the purchaser.