A man says to a woman: 'You are consecrated to me with this cup of wine,' but the cup turns out to contain honey. What is the legal status of the kiddushin?
Halacha 1 establishes that when the object specified in the condition differs from what was actually given — even if one might argue the woman prefers the alternative — the kiddushin is void because the stipulation was not fulfilled.
Question 2
After a man deceives a woman about his status during kiddushin, she says: 'In my heart I was willing to be consecrated to him even though he misled me.' What effect does this statement have?
Halacha 2 rules explicitly that 'feelings in one's heart are not the same as explicit statements,' so her internal willingness cannot retroactively fulfill the unstated or falsified stipulation.
Question 3
A man says: 'You are consecrated to me on condition that my name is Yosef,' and it turns out his name is Yosef and Shimon. What is the ruling?
Halacha 3 rules that when the stipulation is fulfilled and more, the kiddushin is valid. Only if he had said 'on condition that my name is only Yosef' would the additional name Shimon void it.
Question 4
A man stipulates: 'On condition that I am righteous,' yet he is widely known to be thoroughly wicked. What is the legal status of the kiddushin?
Halacha 5 rules that even a known wicked person's 'righteous' stipulation creates doubtful kiddushin, because it is possible he harbored genuine thoughts of repentance in his heart at that moment, which would make him righteous.
Question 5
A man consecrates a woman believing she is from a priestly family, but she is actually from a Levite family. He made no explicit stipulation about her lineage. What is the ruling?
Halacha 6 rules that when no explicit stipulation was made, a man's mistaken belief about the woman's background does not void the kiddushin, since 'she did not cause him to err' — meaning he never conditioned the kiddushin on that fact.