הלכות נדרים

When two people are forbidden - by vow or by oath - to derive benefit from each other, they are allowed to return a lost article to each other, because doing so is a mitzvah. 4:2). In a place where it is customary for the person who returns a lost article to receive a reward, the reward should be given to the Temple treasury. For if [the person who returns the lost article] will take the reward, he will be receiving benefit.). If he does not take it, he will be giving the other person benefit.

They are [both] permitted [to make use of] those entities that are owned jointly by the entire Jewish people, 5:4). e.g., the Temple Mount, its chambers, its courtyards, and a well in the midst of a highway.). They are forbidden [to make use of] those entities that are owned jointly by all the inhabitants of that city, (Yoreh De'ah 224:1) quotes both views. See the Lechem Mishneh and the Turei Zahav 224:1 who elaborate in support of the Rambam's position. e.g., its marketplace, its bathhouse, its synagogue, its ark, and its holy texts.

What can they do so that they will be permitted to use these entities? Each one of them should sign over his portion to the nasi 48a). or to another person and have him acquire that portion through the medium of another person. 4:2). Thus when either of them enter a bathhouse belonging to all the members of the city or to the synagogue, he is not entering the property of the colleague [from whom he is forbidden to benefit], for each of them has relinquished his share of the place and given it away as a present.

[The following laws apply when] they are both partners in a courtyard. If it can be divided, 2:1 which states that if after the division of a courtyard, each of the homeowners will receive a plot of land four cubits by four cubits as his individual property, the courtyard should be divided if one of the neighbors requests that this be done. they are forbidden to enter it unless it is divided and each person enters his portion. If it cannot be divided, each one should enter his house, saying: "I am entering my property.", i.e., retroactively, it becomes apparent that when he enters the courtyard, he is entering property that was designated as his. We are forced to accept this definition (even though generally, the principle of bereirah is not followed in questions of Scriptural Law), for there is no alternative in this instance. The person has a right to the courtyard and he cannot be forbidden from using his own property. See Siftei Cohen 226:4, Turei Zahav 226:1. Regardless, they are both forbidden to place a mill or an oven there or to raise chickens in this courtyard. 57b relates that partners in a courtyard have the right to prevent each other from performing such activities. Although most partners do not exercise this right, in this instance, by failing to exercise the right, one is providing benefit to the other person (Rabbenu Nissim).

When two people are partners in a courtyard and one of them takes an oath that the other may not benefit from him, we force the person who took the oath to sell his portion.
If he took an oath not to benefit from the other person, he is permitted to enter his home, for he is entering his own domain. (Yoreh De'ah 226:2) states that the person who took the vow is forbidden to enter the courtyard. The rationale is that the Rambam's understanding is accepted, except that an additional stringency is applied, lest the person remain in the courtyard for other purposes besides entering and departing his home (Siftei Cohen 226:10). He may not, however, make any other use of the courtyard, as explained [in the previous halachah]. 46a as support for his understanding. He mentions that the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 5:2) appears to support the Rambam's interpretation, but states that we should abide by the principle that whenever there is a difference of opinion between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, the perspective of the Babylonian Talmud should be followed. See the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh who try to reconcile the differences in the positions of the two Talmuds. As mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch follows the Rambam's understanding, but is even more stringent.

If a person from outside was forbidden to benefit from either of [the owners of the courtyard], he may enter the courtyard, (Yoreh De'ah 226:1) states that this applies only when the other owner of the courtyard needs that person. Otherwise, he is forbidden to enter. for he tells [the person from whom he is forbidden to benefit]: "I am entering your colleague's domain, not yours."

When a person forbids himself from benefiting from one of the nations, he is permitted to buy [an article] from them at more than the market price and sell to them at less than the market price. If he forbids them from benefiting from him, if they are willing, it is permitted for him to purchase from them for less than the market price and sell to them at more than the market price. We do not issue a decree forbidding him to sell [at less than the market price], lest he purchase [at less than the market price]. [The rationale is that] he did not take a vow concerning only one individual, in which instance such a decree would be appropriate, but concerning an entire nation and if it is impossible for him to do business with one person, he will do business with another. Therefore, if he forbade himself from benefiting from them, he may lend both articles and money to them, but may not borrow either of these from them. 227:7).

If he forbade them from benefiting from him and himself from benefiting from them, he should not do business with them, nor may they do business with him. He may not borrow an article from them or lend an article to them, nor borrow money from them or lend money from them.

When a person forbade himself from benefiting from any other people, he is permitted to derive benefit from leket, shichechah, pe'ah refers to crops that drop from a reaper's hand in the field. He is forbidden to pick them up again, but instead must leave them for the poor (Leviticus 19:10 . Shichechah refers to crops or bundles forgotten in the field by accident. The harvesters may not return and collect, but must instead leave them for the poor (Deuteronomy 24:19 . Pe'ah refers to a corner of the field which must be left unharvested, so that it could be harvested by the poor (Leviticus 19:9 . See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim chs. 1,4, and 5 where these mitzvot are discussed. and the tithe for the poor that is distributed in the granaries, ch. 6). The person who took the vow is allowed to benefit from these crops, because the owner of the field is not considered as giving him anything of his own. Instead, he is fulfilling a mitzvah. but not that [which is distributed] from one's home. 83-84a explains this distinction. When the tithe for the poor is distributed in the granaries, it may be taken by a poor person without asking. The owner does not have the right to decided to whom he will give it. If, however, he has already brought produce from the tithe for the poor home, he has the right to choose to whom to give it.

When a person forbade priests or Levites from benefiting from his property, they may come and take the gifts [to be separated from his produce] which must be given to the priests. against his will.
If he says: "These priests and these Levites [are forbidden to benefit from my property,]" they are bound by the prohibition. and tithes may be given to others, there is no reason to take away the person's right to distribute them as he desires, for that right is of financial value (Nedarim 84b). He should give his terumah and tithes to other priests and Levites. Similar laws apply with regard to the gifts for the poor 227:9 and Turei Zahav 227:3 who rule that this concept also applies with regard to charity. and the poor.

When it is forbidden for a person to benefit a colleague and that colleague has nothing to eat, the person may go to a storekeeper and say: "So-and-so is forbidden to benefit from me and I don't know what to do." (Yoreh De'ah 221:8) is even more lenient and states that he may say: "Anyone who sustains so-and-so will not suffer a loss," for he is still merely intimating that one should support him. He may not say: "Whoever hears my voice should sustain so-and-so," for that it a direct command. Nor may he tell one person: "If you sustain so-and-so, you will not suffer a loss," for then it appears as if he is appointing him as an agent for this purpose. It is permitted for the storekeeper to go and give [food] to the colleague and take [payment] from that person. 221:8)]. If he, nevertheless, chooses to pay it, he is not considered to have given benefit to that colleague.

[Similar laws apply] states that the two instances are not entirely analogous, for the first involves providing the person with food necessary for his livelihood, while the second involves the performance of a task that is important, but not vital for him. Perhaps this is the reason why in the preceding halachah, the Rambam stated: "The person may go to a storekeeper," i.e., he is permitted as an initial and preferred option. In this halachah, by contrast, he states: "If the person... approached workers," i.e., the Rambam is describing a law that applies after the fact, but not initially. if it is necessary to build [that colleague's] house, put up a fence for him, or harvest his field. If the person from whom it was forbidden to benefit approached workers and told them: "So-and-so is forbidden to benefit from me and I don't know what to do," They may then perform these activities, go back to that person, and he may pay them. For he is paying the debt of the colleague and we already explained that a person [from whom one is forbidden to benefit] may pay a debt for his colleague.

If the two were traveling on a journey and [the person who is forbidden to benefit from his colleague] does not have anything to eat, [that colleague] may give [food] to another person as a present and [the person who is forbidden] is then permitted to partake of it. 221:52. If there is no one else with them, [the person whose property is forbidden] should put [food] on a stone and say: "This [food] is considered ownerless for everyone who desires it." 221:53). The other person may then take it and eat.

If, [however,] he gives a colleague a present [of a feast] and tells him: "This feast is given to you as a present. Let so-and-so who is forbidden to benefit from me come and eat with us," this is forbidden. 48b gives as an example, an instance where a person's father was forbidden to benefit from him. When he made a wedding feast for his son, he tried to employ this tactic to enable his father to attend. Moreover, even if he gave the present without saying anything, but afterwards states that there are opinions that maintain that this law applies only when the statements were made immediately after giving the feast. The wording chosen by the Rambam, however, indicates that the law applies even if he makes the statements later. The interpretation of the Kessef Mishneh is borne out by the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 5:5). said: "Do you want so-and-so to come and eat with us?" it is forbidden if it appears that initially, he gave the present solely so that ultimately so-and-so could eat with them. For example, it is a large feast and he wants his father, his teacher, or the like to partake of the feast. For [the size of] the feast indicates that he did not intend to give it to him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

Any present that, were it to be consecrated [by the recipient], the consecration would not be effective, is not considered as a present. states this principle in continuation of the above story. After the son gave the wedding feast to a colleague so that his father could attend, that colleague consecrated it. When the giver, protested saying that he had not given it to him for that purpose, the recipient complained that he was not going to serve as a medium to allow the first person to break his vow. When the Sages were asked to rule about this situation, they stated the principle mentioned by the Rambam here.
Whenever a person gives a colleague a present with the stipulation that he transfer it to another person, that other person acquires ownership at the time the first [recipient] transfers it to him. If the first recipient does not transfer it to that other person, neither the first, nor the second [recipient] acquires it. 3:6). The second person does not acquire it, because ownership was never transferred to him.

[The following principle applies when a person's son-in-law is forbidden to benefit from him and he desires to give his daughter money so that she can benefit from it and spend it as she desires. He should give her a present and say: "This money 222:1). is given to you as a present on the condition that your husband has no authority over it. 11:8) states that from Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13, it appears that the inclusion of this part of the statement is not an absolute necessity. As long as he specifies that the present is being given for a specific purpose alone, the husband does not acquire rights to it. Rav Yosef Caro does not accept this option, however, in his Kessef Mishneh and quotes the Rambam's wording from this halachah in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 222:1; see Siftei Cohen 222:2). Instead, it shall be used for what you put in your mouth, what you cloth yourself, and the like." 11:8). Even if he said: "...on the condition that your husband has no authority over it. Instead, it shall be used for whatever you want to do with it," 88b. The Rambam's ruling follows the opinion of Shmuel although generally, with regard to matters involving the Torah's prohibitions, the halachah follows that of Rav. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh state that other Rishonim also follow Shmuel's perspective and give logical support for it. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 222:1) quotes both views without stating which should be followed. the husband does not acquire it and she may do what she desires with it.
If, however, he gave her a present and told her. "...on the condition that your husband has no authority over it," but did not specify the purpose for which the present was being given or even did not say that it was intended for whatever she desires, the husband acquires it to derive benefit from it. 3:13. The rationale is that the giver does not have the prerogative of negating the rights given the husband by the Rabbis. This would be forbidden, because he is forbidden to benefit from his father-in-law.