הלכות נדרים

When a person tells a colleague: "Benefit that leads to your food is forbidden to me," or "Benefit that leads to my food is forbidden to you," the person who is forbidden should not borrow from the other person: a sifter, a strainer, a hand mill, an oven, or any other utensil used to prepare food. He may, however, borrow from him bracelets, rings, and other articles that are not used to produce food. He is forbidden to borrow from him a sack or a donkey to carry produce.

[In the above situation,] in a place where utensils are given out only for a fee, it is forbidden to borrow [without charge] even utensils that are not used to produce food. If they were in a place where a fee is not charged and he borrowed from him utensils that are not used to produce food to look impressive to others because of them so that he will receive benefit from them or he sought to pass through his property so that he could reach a place where he would derive benefit, there is an unresolved question whether it is prohibited. Therefore, if he transgresses, he is not liable for lashes.

There is no difference between one who takes a vow not to benefit from a colleague and one who takes a vow not to derive benefit that leads to food except [permission to] pass through [property] and borrowing utensils that are not used to produce food in a place where they are borrowed without charge.

When Reuven was forbidden to benefit from Shimon, either through a vow or through an oath, Shimon may give the half-shekel which Reuven is obligated to give. which every Jew is obligated to pay to the Temple treasury as his share in the communal sacrifices. See Hilchot Shekalim 1:1. Similarly, he may pay a debt that he owes. [The rationale is that] Reuven does not receive anything, all [Shimon does] is prevent a claim from being lodged against him. And preventing a claim from being lodged is not included in the prohibition against [giving] benefit. 26:6 where the Rambam states that if "a person pays a promissory note of a colleague without that colleague's knowledge, even if it is a debt for which security was given, the borrower is not required to pay him anything. The borrower may take his security.... The other person forfeits his money. [The rationale is that] perhaps the borrower would have been able to appease the lender and have him waive the debt." Thus by paying Reuven's debt, Shimon is not considered to have given him anything.
Therefore [Shimon] may provide food for [Reuven's] wife, 12:19 which states that when a husband traveled to a distant country and left his wife without resources, if another person gives the woman money without clearly specifying that he is extending a loan to her, he forfeits his money. Even though the husband is obligated to pay for his wife's provisions, as long as a debt is not formally established, the person who pays the money has no claim upon him. his sons, and his servants, even his Canaanite servants, even though [Reuven] is obligated to provide for their sustenance. He may not, however, provide food for [Reuven's] animal, whether a kosher animal or a non-kosher one, for any increase in the animal's weight is benefit given to Reuven.

If Shimon was a priest, he is permitted to offer sacrifices brought by Reuven. [The rationale is that] the priests are agents of God and not the agents of the person bringing the sacrifice.
Shimon may marry off his daughter who is past maturity to Reuven with her consent. If, however, she is a na'arah, 2:1-2). Needless to say, this applies if the girl is a minor, in which instance, her consecration is dependent entirely on her father. she is under his domain. [Hence,] it is forbidden [to marry her to him], 3:11. because this is like giving him a maid-servant to serve him.

Shimon may separate terumah on behalf of Reuven and separate his tithes with his consent. is not effective (Bava Metzia 22a). What is meant by "with his consent"? For example, Reuven said: "Whoever desires to separate terumah [from my produce] may do so." He may not, however, tell Shimon to separate terumah on his behalf, for then he is making him his agent and this is [deriving] benefit from him.

[Shimon] may instruct [Reuven] in the Oral Law, 31a). for it is forbidden to charge a wage for teaching it. 1:7, 3:10 where the Rambam issues such a ruling and explains that this is derived from Deuteronomy 4:5: "Behold, I [Moses] have taught you laws and statutes, as God commanded me." On this basis, Nedarim 37a teaches that Moses was implying: "Just as I learned at no cost, so, too, you have been instructed at no cost by me. And so, too, should you teach the coming generations at no cost."
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 4:3), the Rambam writes:
According to our Torah, there is no way that it is permitted to take a wage for teaching any of the Torah's professions....
I am amazed at the men of stature who aroused by desire, denied the truth had wages designated for themselves for giving Torah rulings and instruction, citing flimsy support.
See also the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah Avot 4:7. It must, however, by noted that most authorities [see Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 246:5) allow a teacher to charge for the time he spends teaching Torah on the basis of the principle of sechar batalah, i.e., he could have spent the time he spends teaching working at another profession which would bring him an income. He is allowed to be reimbursed for the money he loses by choosing to teach Torah instead. For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:2) does not accept the Rambam's ruling and forbids Shimon from teaching Reuven. The Written Law, by contrast, may not be taught by him, because a wage can be charged for teaching it. 37a gives two reasons why it is permitted for a teacher of young children to charge a wage for his services: a) he is not charging for teaching; he is charging for being a disciplinarian; b) he is not charging for teaching the wordings of Torah; he is charging for teaching the cantillation notes. (For at that time, there were no texts with vowels and the Written Law was studied by memorizing its chants.) The first rationale does not apply with regard to adults, but the second does. If it is not customary [in that community] to charge for instruction in the Written Law, this is permitted. Regardless of [the local custom with regard to payment], [Shimon] may teach [Reuven's] son.

If Reuven becomes ill, Shimon may come and visit him. 39a). In a place where one who sits with a person who is ill to keep him company receives a wage, Shimon should not sit with him. Instead, he should visit him and stand. 221:19 who writes that if he charges for his time, he may sit and pay the sick person a longer visit. He may personally give him medical treatment, for this fulfills a mitzvah. 4:4), the Rambam states that it is a mitzvah of Scriptural origin for a doctor to heal a sick person.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 221:4) states that when medical attention is given without charge, he may treat him without charge. If, however, it is customary for a doctor to charge, he must also do so.

When an animal belonging to Reuven becomes ill,, this clause is included as the conclusion of the previous halachah rather than at the beginning of this one. Shimon should not give it veterinary attention. He may, however, tell him: "Do such and such for it." 41b). The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 221) explains that if there is no one else capable of treating the animal but Shimon, Shimon may do so, because the mitzvah of returning a lost object also includes doing what is necessary to save a colleague's livestock. The Radbaz also adds the rationale that Scriptural Law requires us to alleviate an animal's discomfort.
[Shimon] may wash with Reuven in a large bath, but not in a small bath, because he gives him pleasure by raising the water over him. He may sleep in the same bed as him in the summer, but not in the winter, because he warms him. (Yoreh De'ah 221:5) states that this applies with regard to a small bed. If the bed is large, even in the winter, it is permitted. He may sit on the same couch as him and eat at the same table, but may not eat from the same plate or from the same food trough that is placed before workers. [The rationale is that we fear that] Shimon will leave a nice piece of meat and refrain from eating it so that Shimon will eat it or move it closer to him and in this way, bring him benefit. Similar concepts apply with regard to produce in a food trough. It is, however, permitted for Shimon to eat from a plate even though he knows that when he returns it to the host, the host will place it before Reuven. We do not fear that [Shimon] will leave a choice cut of meat for [Reuven]. (Yoreh De'ah 221:5)]. The Rama adds that if the serving plate contained a very large amount, there is no prohibition.

It is permitted for Reuven to drink a cup of comfort 8b). of his own [wine] from Shimon's hand. Similarly, he may give him the cup of the bathhouse, 38b states that Shimon may give Reuven "the cup of peace" and advances these two interpretations for the term. The Rambam does not consider the interpretations as mutually exclusive, for the same principle - that the satisfaction Shimon gives Reuven is minimal - applies in both instances (Kessef Mishneh). for this does not involve satisfaction.

[The following laws apply if] Shimon owned a bathhouse or an olive press that were hired out [to others] in the city. If Shimon retains a hold on them, e.g., he left a portion for himself and did not hire it out, it is forbidden for Reuven to enter that bathhouse or tread in that olive press. [This applies] even if he retains merely one tub in the bathhouse or one press 1:7) the Rambam defines the term ekal as referring to a container made from ropes in which olives are placed and crushed. in the olive press. If he did not retain anything for himself, but rather hired it out in its entirety, it is permitted [for Reuven to enter].

It is forbidden for Reuven to partake of the produce of Shimon's field, even during the Sabbatical year when everything is ownerless, for he took the vow before the beginning of the Sabbatical year. If he took the vow in the Sabbatical year itself, [Reuven] may partake of the produce that hangs outside the field. He may not, however, enter the field even though the land is ownerless. [This is] a decree lest he remain there after he partook of [the produce], for the Torah declared [the land] ownerless only during the time the produce is found within it.

When does the above apply? When he told him: "Benefit from this property is forbidden to you." If, however, [Shimon] told [Reuven]: "It is forbidden for you to benefit from my property," or Reuven took an oath or a vow [prohibiting him from benefiting] from Shimon's property, when the Sabbatical year begins, he may partake of the produce of his field, for they have left Shimon's domain. 42b). And when Reuven takes an oath or a vow not to benefit from Shimon's property, the oath or the vow does not pertain to this produce, for it does not belong to Shimon. He may not, however, enter his field for the reasons we explained [in the previous halachah].

[Different laws apply if] only benefiting from Shimon's food was forbidden to Reuven, If, either because of a vow or an oath, the prohibition took effect before the Sabbatical year, he may enter his field, but may not eat his produce. If the prohibition took effect in the Sabbatical year, he may enter his field and partake of his produce, for this produce does not belong to Shimon. Instead, it is ownerless.

It is forbidden for Reuven to lend [articles] to Shimon. [This is] a decree, lest he borrow from him although it is forbidden for him to benefit from him. Similarly, it is forbidden for [Reuven] to give [Shimon] a loan. [This is] a decree, lest he borrow from him. Similarly, he may not sell something to him. [This is] a decree, lest he buy from him.

If it happened that [Shimon] was working with [Reuven], e.g., they were harvesting together, he should work far from him. [This is] a decree, lest he help him.
When [a father] takes a vow, forbidding his son to benefit from him because the son does not occupy himself in Torah study, the father is permitted to fill up a jug of water [for his son], light a lamp [for him], or roast a small fish. For [the father's] intent was only to forbid [his son] from deriving significant pleasure and these matters are not considered important by the son. 38b) in another way. The Radbaz explains that halachically, both interpretations are acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 223:1) quotes the Ra'avad's interpretation, but not of the Rambam. Accordingly, the Bayit Chadash maintains that according to the Shulchan Aruch, the Rambam's interpretation is not accepted. See also Turei Zahav 223:1 and Siftei Cohen 223:1.

When a person took an oath or a vow not to speak to a colleague, he may write to him 221:65 rules that he may not write a note specifically for that person. Instead, he should write on the wall with the intent that the person see. Others, however, do not accept this stringency. or speak to another person even though [the person whom he forbade] hears the idea he wants to communicate to him. (Yoreh De'ah 221) is even more stringent, stating that when it is obvious that he is intending for the person to whom he is forbidden to speak to hear, he may not speak even to another colleague. The Geonim ruled in this manner.