When Reuven tells Shimon: "I [am forbidden] to you like a dedication offering" or "You are forbidden to benefit from me," it is forbidden for Shimon to benefit from Reuven.). If he transgresses and benefits from him, he is not liable for lashes, because Shimon did not say anything., he would be liable, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1. See Chapter 10, Halachah 12, from which it is apparent that if Reuven voluntarily allows Shimon to benefit from his property, Reuven is liable for lashes, for he is desecrating his own vow. As indicated by Hilchot Meilah 4:9, even though the person is not liable for lashes, he is liable to bring a sacrifice for atonement, since with regard to him, it is as if he benefited from consecrated property. Reuven is permitted to derive benefit from Shimon, because he did not forbid this to himself.
If he tells Shimon: "You [are forbidden] to me like a dedication offering" or "I am forbidden to benefit from you," Reuven is forbidden to benefit from Shimon. If he derives benefit, he is liable for lashes, because he desecrated his word. Shimon is permitted to benefit from Reuven. If he tells him: "I [am forbidden] to you like a dedication offering and you are [forbidden] to me" or "I am forbidden to benefit from you and you are forbidden to benefit from me," they are both forbidden to benefit from each other. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
If Reuven tells Shimon: "So-and-so's produce is forbidden to you" or "You are forbidden to benefit from so-and-so," his words are of no consequence. For a person cannot cause his colleague to be prohibited with regard to a matter that is not his unless [that person] responds Amen, as we explained.
🔀 Who Bears the Prohibition
A vow's binding force follows its grammatical direction. Reuven saying "I am forbidden to you" binds Shimon — yet Reuven may freely benefit from Shimon. Reuven saying "You are forbidden to me" binds only Reuven, making him liable for lashes if he transgresses. A third party cannot bind someone to another's property at all — unless that person responds Amen.
When a person tells a colleague: "This loaf [of bread] of mine is forbidden to you," it [remains] forbidden to him even if he gives it to him as a present. If he dies, and [the other person] inherits it or [it is acquired by a third party] who gives it to him as a present, he is permitted. For [the one taking the vow said] "My loaf," and now it is not his.
If he tells him: "This produce is forbidden to you," but does not say: "My produce," even if he sold it or died and it became the property of another person, (Yoreh De'ah 216) states that this applies when the person taking the vow says: "During my lifetime and after my death." From the Rambam's words and a comparison to Halachah 6, it is apparent that he need not make such a specification. See Turei Zahav 216:10 which discusses these two perspectives. it [remains] forbidden to him. For when a person causes his property to be forbidden to a colleague, it remains forbidden unless he says: "my property," "my house," "my produce," or uses another similar term. For in those instances, he only forbade [using] the articles while they were in his possession.
When a person tells his son: "You are forbidden to benefit from me" or he takes and oath that his son is forbidden to benefit from him, when he dies, the son may inherit his property. For this is as if he says: "My property is forbidden to you." If he forbade [the son] from benefiting from him and specified: "During my lifetime and after my death," if he dies, [the son] should not inherit his [estate]. For this is as if he said: "This property is forbidden to you."
🗝️ Possessive Language Limits Scope
The word "my" ties a prohibition to the vow-maker's current possession: once the item leaves his domain (via gift, sale, death, or inheritance), the ban lifts. Saying "this produce" — without a possessive — creates an object-bound prohibition that persists through all transfers of ownership. This same logic extends to a father's vow against his son: it functions like "my property is forbidden to you" and does not block inheritance — unless he explicitly specifies "in my lifetime and after my death."
When a person forbids his son from benefiting from him and says: "If this son's son will be a Torah scholar, this son will acquire this property to transfer it to his son," explains that ordinarily, the son may use the estate to pay a debt or to give it to his brother as a present. If, however, the grandson is a Torah scholar, this is forbidden and it is as if the estate was transferred to him directly and the father cannot use it for other purposes. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation where the father had two sons and if this son's son was not a Torah scholar, he would give his entire estate to the other son. this is permissible. The son is forbidden [to benefit] from his father's estate and the grandson is permitted to derive such benefit interprets this as meaning that the estate will be given to the grandson. The Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De'ah 223) explains that implicit in the grandfather's statement is the stipulation that if the grandson is not a Torah scholar, he - like his father - will be forbidden to benefit from the estate. See Siftei Cohen 223:4. if he is a Torah scholar as was stipulated.
If this son who is forbidden to benefit from his father's estate gives 223:3. [the property] he inherits from his father to his brother or his sons, they are permitted to benefit from them. This also applies if he paid a debt with them or paid [the money due] his wife [by virtue of] her ketubah. He must tell [the recipients] that [the payment they receive] is from the estate of his father which was forbidden to him. [The rationale for this leniency is that] when a person takes an oath that a colleague will not benefit from his property, he may pay that colleague's debt, as will be explained. (Yoreh De'ah 223) questions the Rambam's ruling, explaining that although the father would have been permitted to pay the son's debt, for the son to pay his own debt with the estate's money is considered as benefiting from the estate. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 223:4) accepts the Rambam's ruling.
🏛️ Navigating Forbidden Estates
Even when a son is forbidden his father's estate, creative halakhic structures remain available. A grandfather may condition a transfer: "if my grandson becomes a Torah scholar, let my son acquire the estate in order to pass it on." Furthermore, a son forbidden from benefiting may still give that inheritance to siblings, children, or creditors — provided he discloses its forbidden origin — since paying another's debt is not considered personal benefit.
When a person was forbidden - either through a vow or an oath - to partake of a type of food, he is permitted to partake of other types of food that were cooked or mixed together with [the forbidden] food, even though it has [acquired] the flavor of the forbidden food.). If he was forbidden to partake of specific produce). and that produce became mixed with others, if they have the flavor of the forbidden food, [the other food] is forbidden. If not, it is permitted.
What is implied? A person who is forbidden to partake of meat or wine may partake of soup or vegetables that were cooked with meat or wine. [This applies] even if they have the flavor of meat or wine. He is forbidden only to eat meat alone or drink wine alone.
If, however, he forbade himself [to partake of] "this meat" or "this wine," if the vegetables have the flavor of meat or wine, they are forbidden. If not, they are permitted. For this meat or this wine become considered like the meat of nevelot, teeming animals, or the like. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Therefore if one says: "This meat is forbidden for me," he is forbidden to partake of it, its sauce, and the spices [cooked] with it.
If the wine which he forbade himself emphasizes that the Rambam is speaking about a vow which a person made himself, for he can have such a vow released. If, however, he responds to another person, he cannot ask for the vow's release. became mixed with other wine, 216:13). even one drop in an entire barrel, the entire quantity becomes forbidden. [The rationale is that] since he has the possibility to ask for the release of his vow, [the forbidden substance] is considered as an entity that can be permitted and hence, never becomes nullified in [a majority of permitted] substances of its own kind, as explained in Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot.
When a person says: "This produce is like a sacrifice for me," "...a sacrifice to my mouth," or "...a sacrifice because of my mouth," he is forbidden to partake of anything exchanged for them or produce that grows from them.). The Ra'avad (in his gloss to Halachah 16) asks: Why is the produce that grows from the forbidden produce prohibited. Seemingly, we should follow the principle: Zeh vizeh goraim mutar, when an entity is produced by two factors, one permitted and one forbidden, it is permitted. Here as well, since the second generation produce was produced by the forbidden produce and also by the earth, it should be permitted. The Radbaz explains that since a vow is involved, we follow the principle mentioned in Halachah 12, that since the prohibition involved can be released entirely, we do not consider it nullified because another factor is also involved. Needless to say, this applies to juices produced by them.
🍖 Flavor, Mixtures & Sacrificial Status
A vow on a category of food ("meat," "wine") forbids only that substance alone — its flavor absorbed by other foods remains permitted. A vow on "this meat" or "this wine" elevates the item to quasi-nevelah status: even its flavor, sauce, and spices become forbidden. Forbidden wine mixed into other wine — even a single drop — renders the entire barrel prohibited, because since the vow can be released, the wine is a davar she'yesh lo matirin that is never nullified within its own kind.
[The following rules apply] if a person took a vow or an oath not to eat [produce] or not to taste it. If it is an entity whose seed decomposes when it is sown like wheat or barley, he is permitted [to partake of] the articles exchanged for it and the produce that grows from it. If it was an entity whose seed does not decompose in the earth when it is sown, like onions or garlic, even the produce that grows from the produce that grows from it is forbidden. In all situations, there is a doubt [whether he is forbidden to drink] the juices they produce. 52b leaves unresolved the question whether in this context the juice produced from the fruit is considered as the fruit or not. Hence, because of the doubt, one is forbidden to partake of it, but cannot be held liable for punishment. This refers to fruits other than grapes or olives. In the latter instances, the liquid is considered as the fruit. Therefore, if he drinks them, he is not liable for lashes.
Similarly, if a person tells his wife: "The work produced by your hands 216:8 states that we are referring to an instance that the husband uses wording similar to that suggested in Chapter 3, Halachah 11; alternatively, that he is referring to work which his wife already performed. Otherwise, there would be a difficulty because a vow is not effective unless the object concerned already exists. is like a sacrifice to me," "...a sacrifice to my mouth," or "...a sacrifice because of my mouth," he is forbidden to partake of anything exchanged for [her earnings] or produce that grows from her work. 57a) is restating the concepts mentioned in the previous halachah in a different context. If he says that he will not to eat [from the work of her hands], nor taste it, if the produce [that grew from] the work of her hands is an entity whose seed decomposes, he is permitted [to partake of] articles exchanged for it and the produce that grows from it. If it was an entity whose seed does not decompose, even the produce that grows from the produce that grows from them is forbidden. Why do we not consider the original produce that is forbidden insignificant because of the [new] growth that is larger than it? Because the original produce is an entity whose prohibition can be released, which is not nullified [when mixed] with a majority [of permitted substances], as explained.
When a person forbids his produce to a colleague, whether by vow or by an oath, there is an unresolved question if the produce that grows from it 47a, it appears that the produce grown from the fruits of his efforts is definitely forbidden. The Radbaz, however, explains that the Rambam has a different way of understanding that Talmudic passage. and articles exchanged for it [are permitted to the colleague]. explains that the question is: Since these entities have not come into existence as of yet, can he cause them to be forbidden to his colleague. Therefore the produce that grows from it and articles exchanged for it are forbidden to his colleague. If he transgresses and benefits, he has benefited..
הלכה י״ז׳
🌱 What Sprouts From the Forbidden
Whether produce-growths are forbidden depends on the vow's wording and the nature of the seed. A vow not to eat or taste produce whose seed decomposes in the ground (wheat, barley) permits subsequent crops and exchanges — the original is gone. But non-decomposing seeds (onions, garlic) remain themselves, so even great-grandgrowths are forbidden. The same rules apply to a wife's handiwork. Juices are always a safek (doubt) — forbidden but not punishable by lashes. When one forbids his produce to a colleague, growths and exchanges remain in doubt, so forbidden in practice but without liability for transgression.
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🎓 Key Principles
Chapter 5
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Direction Defines Obligation Whose mouth formed the vow, and toward whom it was directed, determines who is bound. The same words in different order produce entirely different legal outcomes — the vow-maker may be free while the addressee is bound, or vice versa.
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"My" Ties the Vow to Present Ownership Possessive language ("my loaf," "my produce") limits the prohibition to the period of the vow-maker's ownership. Once the item changes hands legitimately, the ban dissolves. Without the possessive, the object itself carries the prohibition permanently.
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Category Vows vs. Specific-Object Vows Forbidding a general food category bars only direct consumption of that item — absorbed flavor is irrelevant. Forbidding a specific, designated item elevates it to inherently-forbidden status, where even its flavor, sauce, and spices become prohibited to the vow-taker.
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Davar She'Yesh Lo Matirin — The Releasable Prohibition Any prohibition that can be annulled by a sage is classified as a "thing that has a permit." Such an entity is never nullified within its own kind — even one drop of forbidden wine contaminates an entire barrel — because it is preferable to release the vow than to declare it nullified.