הלכות נדרים

A father [has the right to] nullify any differ and maintain that the Sifri states that the father's rights are the same as the husband's. In a response attributed to the Rambam, he explains that although this view is stated in the Sifri, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Talmud and the simple meaning of the Biblical passage does not lead to such an inference. This leads to the conclusion that the statement of the Sifri is a minority opinion. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:58) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed. vows and oaths [taken by his daughter only] on the day he hears of them, as [Numbers 30:6] states: "[But if her father withheld her on the day that he heard,] all of her vows and prohibitions interprets this term as referring to oaths.... [shall not stand]."
A husband,, the second stage of the marriage relationship. by contrast, may nullify only those vows and oaths that involve personal aggravation or they are matters that affect the marriage relationship, e.g., she took an oath or a vow not to put on eye-paint or wear jewelry. (234:59) mentions other views which consider these vows as ones that involve personal aggravation as well as the Rambam's view that these are matters that affect the husband-wife relationship. [This is implied by ibid.:17]: "between a man and his wife."

What is the difference between [the laws governing] vows that involve personal aggravation and those that affect the marriage relationship. With regard to vows that involve personal aggravation, his nullification has bearing for himself and for others. With regard to those involving the marriage relationship, his nullification has bearing for himself but not for others.

What is implied? She took a vow not to eat meat. He may nullify it and she will be permitted to eat meat if she is married to any other person forever. If she forbade marital intimacy with any man, he may nullify the vow with regard to himself 234:83 quotes views that maintain that since the vow takes effect with regard to other men, it would also take effect with regard to him if he did not nullify it. and she may engage in intimacy with him. If, however, he dies or divorces her, she is forbidden to engage in intimacy with all other men. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

What is implied? She took a vow or an oath "not to bathe today," "not drink wine today," or "not to eat honey today," he may nullify the vows. [This also applies if] she vowed "not to put on eye paint today" or "not to wear colored woven garments today." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Even if she took a vow [not to partake of] an unpleasant food. The Chatam Sofer explains that since it is forbidden to eat unpleasant foods on Yom Kippur - when fasting is described as aggravating one's soul - even unpleasant foods are included in this category.
The Turei Zahav 234:51, however, translates the term as "harmful foods," arguing that if the woman considered the food unpleasant and had no desire for it, it would not be considered as "aggravation" for her to be prevented from partaking of it. or a type of food that she had never eaten, [her husband] may nullify it.

When she took a vow not to partake of two loaves of bread and not partaking of one would cause her aggravation, but not partaking of the other would not cause her aggravation, quotes Rabbenu Asher's commentary to Nedarim 82b which explains that this refers to a situation where one loaf is made of fine flour and is attractive and one is made of coarse flour and is not. She will suffer aggravation from not eating the first, but not from not eating the second.
There is a slight difficulty with this explanation, because the previous halachah stated that a husband may nullify even a vow involving unpleasant food. It can be explained, however, that since her husband makes it possible for her to partake of the loaf of fine bread, she will have no aggravation over not partaking over the coarse bread. When, however, she is not able to partake of the unpleasant food, she has no similar alternative.
Alternatively, Rabbenu Asher explains that she is hungry and will be satisfied by eating one loaf. Hence, not eating that loaf will give her aggravation. Not eating the second one will not. her husband may nullify the one that would cause her aggravation and may not nullify the one that would not cause her aggravation. notes that when a sage absolves a vow, if he nullifies a portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Chapter 4, Halachah 11). This principle does not, however, hold true with regard to a vow nullified by a husband.

When a woman takes a vow not to eat figs from her native country, [her husband] may nullify her vow, because this is a matter that affects the marriage relationship. (Yoreh De'ah 234:60) appears to follow the view of other Rishonim who maintain that this is also considered a vow involving aggravation. For it is a major problem for him to undertake the difficulty of bringing her [figs] from another place. Therefore, if he dies, divorces her, or another person brings her figs from her native country, they are forbidden to her. For [a husband's] nullification [of a vow that] affects the marriage relationship does not have bearing for others.

Similarly, if she took an oath not to benefit from people at large, even though her husband is not included in the vow, he has the right to nullify it, because it affects the marriage relationship. 11:3) quotes Rabbi Yossi who rules that one may not nullify such a vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this is a minority view.
The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:64) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of other Rishonim who maintain that such a vow is considered one which involves personal aggravation. Otherwise, he will have to give her food only from his own resources. Similarly, he may nullify [the vow] if she [takes a vow], forbidding her from benefiting from an entire nation, who states that the wording of the original is inexact. e.g., all the Jews or all the Ishmaelites.

When a woman tells her husband: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," he need not nullify the vow. To what can the matter be compared? To one who forbids the owner of fruit from benefiting from his own fruit. Similarly, if he tells her: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," his statements are of no consequence, because he is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, clothing, and intimacy, as we explained in Hilchot Ishut. 12:2, based on Exodus 21:10.
If, however, she told him: "Pleasure from intimacy with you is forbidden to me," he must nullify the vow. 14:7 and Chapter 1, Halachah 30, above.
Based on Chapter 3, Halachah 10, it must be concluded that we are referring to an instance where she said "Your body is forbidden to me," for satisfaction is not a tangible matter (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 234:57; Siftei Cohen 234:81). Tosafot maintains that even if he does not say "Your body...," we consider it as if he did. This intent is reflected in the wording chosen by the Shulchan Aruch. If he does not nullify it, it is forbidden for him to engage in relations with her, because we may not force a person to partake of food that is forbidden to him.

If she said: "May my hands be sanctified to the One who made them," or she took a vow that he would not benefit from the labor of her hands, 85a; Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:71)]. See also Hilchot Arachin 6:28. he is not forbidden to benefit from the labor of her hands, because her hands are on lien to him.). Although [our Sages] declared: 59b; Nedarim 86b. "Emancipation, 18:6). [the prohibition against] chametz,) as security for a loan to a gentile, when the prohibition against benefiting from chametz takes effect, the lien is no longer effective and the chametz reverts to the ownership of the Jew and he is obligated to destroy it. and consecration 7:5. sever a lien," our Sages reinforced a husband's lien [on his wife's work and her earnings], preventing her from severing it, because it is of Rabbinic origin. He must, however, nullify the vow, lest he divorce her and then he be forbidden to remarry her. 234:63 who explains why we mention this concern in this instance and not in others where it would seemingly apply.

If she took an oath or a vow that neither the father of her husband, his brothers, or any of his other relatives will benefit from her, he cannot nullify the vow. 21:3, she is not under any obligation to perform work on behalf of these people. Similarly, he may not nullify her vow if she vows not to bring his animal water, 21:5 states, she is obligated to provide straw for his riding animal. She is not, however, obligated to provide water for it, for it is necessary to draw water from a spring or river and that is compromising to a woman's modesty (Kessef Mishneh). As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., the Rambam's ruling is based the version of Ketubot 61b cited by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard published text of the Talmud follows a different understanding. straw for his cattle, or the like. [The rationale is that these vows] do not aggravate the soul, nor do they affect the marriage relationship, [since] they are not of the tasks that she is obligated to perform.

A husband and a father may nullify vows that have not taken effect and have not yet caused prohibitions for her. 6:14). What is implied? She said, for example: "Wine will be forbidden to me if I go to this-and-this place." (Yoreh De'ah 234:28). The Kessef Mishneh and the Rama quote the ruling of Rabbenu Yerucham who maintains that this principle applies only with regard to vows that have not taken effect because the time when they are due to take effect has not come. If, however, they are dependent on a deed, they cannot be nullified until they take effect. See the comments of the Siftei Cohen 234:45 which discusses this issue. Even though she has not yet gone there and [thus the wine] is not yet forbidden, the vow may be nullified. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

A father or a husband who is deaf (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)]. may not nullify vows. to the verse). Even though a husband may nullify vows which he has not heard, when a person is fit to hear a vow, [the fact that he does not] hear it is not of consequence. 234:25)] differs and maintains that it is necessary for him to hear the vow.

Neither a father, nor a husband who is intellectually or emotionally unstable may nullify a vow. A minor cannot establish a marriage bond; 4:7; 11:6. accordingly, he may not nullify a vow. A husband may nullify the vows of two of his wives simultaneously. Similarly, a father may nullify the vows of two of his daughters simultaneously. (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

The nullification of vows may be carried out throughout the entire day. [The right does not continue] for 24 hours.
What is implied? If she took a vow at the beginning of Sunday night, the vow may be nullified throughout that night and the entire day Monday. (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue. When she took a vow at the conclusion of the day, directly before nightfall. If he nullified the vow before nightfall, it is nullified. If he did not nullify it until after nightfall, he may not nullify it any longer.

What is meant by the Torah's words [Numbers 30:15]: "from one day to the next"? They teach that if she takes a vow at night, he may nullify it during the night. And he may nullify it throughout the following day, as we explained.
If she took a vow and waited several days and only then, her father or her husband heard of it, he may nullify it on the day he heard of it. It is as if she took the vow on the day that he heard of it, as [implied by ibid.:6]: "On the day he heard of it," [i.e.,] and not only the day she took the vow.

When a consecrated maiden took a vow and her father heard of it and nullified it and after several days her erus heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified, as [implied by ibid.:6-8]: "If her father prevented her on the day that he heard of it.... If she was married to a man with vows incumbent upon her.... If her husband heard of it. On the day, he heard of it...." From this we infer: Since her father nullified it and her erus heard of it, he must nullify it on the day the father heard of it. Similarly, if her erus heard [of the vow] and nullified it and after several days, the father heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified. (Yoreh De'ah 234:5) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher who maintain that the father and the husband do not have to nullify the vow on the same day. As long as each one nullifies it on the day he hears of it, it is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:13 quotes the opinion of the Bayit Chadash who rules that we should be stringent and follow the Rambam's decision.
How do we know that the verse is speaking about a consecrated maiden? Because further on, the passage [ibid.:11-12] states: "If she vows in her husband's home..., when the woman is living in her husband's home. her husband heard her and remained silent." We can infer that the husband spoken about previously is an erus., as we explained.

When a father or a husband hears of a vow and remains silent in order to cause the woman aggravation, if the day passes without him nullifying or revoking [her vows], they are binding even if he did not have the intent of accepting them.
If she took a vow and her father or her husband nullified it, but without knowing of the nullification, she willfully violated her vow or oath, she is not liable. Although she had the intent of transgressing, since she committed a permitted act, she is exempt. Concerning this, [ibid.:6] states: "God will forgive her, although her father prevented her." She is given stripes for rebellious conduct, because she had the intent to transgress.

If a father or a husband heard of [a woman's] vow, but remained silent, because he did not know that a father or a husband has a right to nullify her vows or he knew that he had a right to nullify her vow, but did not know that such a vow required nullification, when he learns of this, he may nullify [the vow]. The time when he gains this knowledge is equivalent to the time of the vow or the time he heard of it and he may nullify it for that entire day.

[When a nullification is made in error,] one must return and nullify it again. [For example,] his wife took a vow and he thought that she was his daughter, and he nullified it with the intent that she was his daughter. She took a nazirite vow and he thought that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice and he nullified it with the intent that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice. She forbade herself to partake of figs and he thought she said grapes and nullified with the intent that she had forbade grapes. [In all such instances,] he must nullify the vow again when he learns of the vow and the identity of the woman taking the vow for the sake of this woman and this vow. [This can be inferred from ibid.:5]: "Her father did not prevent her"; [this indicates that he must have in mind] the woman taking the vow herself. "And her father heard her vow," derives the same concept from a different verse. i.e., until he knows the vow that she took. He may nullify the vow throughout the entire day that he discovers this information.