הלכות נדרים

There are two categories of vows: The first is to forbid oneself [from benefiting] from entities permitted to him; e.g., he said: "The produce from this-and-this country is forbidden to me for 30 days" or "...forever." "This type of produce is forbidden to me" or "This produce is forbidden." Regardless of the language in which the prohibition is stated, (Biblical Hebrew). they become forbidden to him, even though there is no oath at all, nor did it mention God's name or a term used to describe Him. 2:2, an oath must mention God's name or one of the terms used to describe Him. Concerning this, the Torah [Numbers 30:3] states: "To cause a prohibition to take effect upon his soul," i.e., to cause permitted entities to become forbidden to him. Similarly, such a vow takes effect if he says: "They are forbidden to me." I call this category: "vows involving prohibitions."

The second category is to obligate himself for a sacrifice that he is not required to bring. For example, he said: "I obligate myself [to bring] a burnt offering," "I obligate myself to bring a peace offering," "...a meal offering," or "This animal is a burnt offering," or "...a peace offering."
When he says: "I obligate myself [to bring]...", this is called a vow. When he says: "This is...", it is called a donation. Donations and vows are of the same type [of pledges], but [the one making the pledge] is responsible for a vow. With regard to a donations, by contrast, he is not responsible. Concerning these the Torah states [Deuteronomy 12:17]: "Your vows which you pledge and your donations...." This category, I refer to as "vows of sanctification."

The laws concerning the first category and its relevant matters are [the subject] we will discuss in these halachot. The laws concerning vows of sanctification and their particulars will be discussed in their appropriate place in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot.

It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for a person to carry out his oath or vow (positive commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 575) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. whether it be a vow involving prohibitions or a vow of sanctification, as [Deuteronomy 23:24] states: "Heed the utterances of your mouth and do as you vowed." And [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth." to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban considers these as two separate mitzvot.

When a person forbids himself from partaking of a particular type of food, e.g., he said: "Figs are forbidden to me," "Figs from such-and-such a country are forbidden to me," "These figs are forbidden to me," or the like, if he partakes of any amount of them, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law, (negative commandment 157) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 407) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. as [Numbers, Ibid.] states: "He shall not desecrate his word."
There is no minimum measure [for the desecration of] a vow, for by taking a vow [not to partake of] a substance, it is as if one explicitly stated that he would not partake of even the slightest amount. 4:1. If one said: "It is forbidden for me to eat the produce of this-and-this country" or "...to eat these fruit," he does not receive lashes unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion.

If a person forbade himself from eating figs and grapes - whether in two vows or in one - the two can be combined to make up the measure of an olive-sized portion. 4:8). Even with regard to vows, it applies only when one uses the expression "eating." The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the law applies only when the two are included in the same oath. Their difference of opinion revolves around the understanding of Sh'vuot 22a. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person says: "This produce is considered like a sacrifice," or he tells a colleague: "Everything that I partake of with you is a sacrifice," "...like a sacrifice," "or considered like a sacrifice for me," they are forbidden to him. For it is possible that a person will make a vow for a sacrifice and make an animal that is ordinary a sacrifice and thus be forbidden for him. 4:9-10 which explains that with regard to the person forbidden by the vow, the article becomes like consecrated property. Hence, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice in atonement if he benefits from the article.

If, however, a person says: "This produce is considered for me...", "This type of produce is considered for me...", "What I will eat with so-and-so will be considered as pig meat," "...as a false deity," "...as nevelot and trefot," or the like, they are permitted and no vow takes effect. [The rationale is that] it is impossible for a person to make something that is not pig meat as pig meat.

This is the general principle [that applies] whenever anyone attempts to have permitted entities considered as forbidden entities: If he could have endowed that forbidden entity with its status by taking a vow, [the permitted entities] are forbidden. If he cannot endow it with its status by taking a vow, [the permitted entities] remain permitted.

Sin-offerings and guilt-offerings cannot be brought as vows or as donations, as will be explained in the appropriate place. 14:8, Hilchot Shegagot 1:1. These sacrifices are required when a person transgresses a prohibition. If he does not transgress, he may not bring such a sacrifice and if he does transgress, he is compelled to do so. Offering it is not dependent on his vow. Nevertheless, it is possible for a person making a vow to offer them as a result of his vow. For a person who takes a nazirite vow must bring a sin offering, 6:11; 8:1. and if he becomes impure, 7:2). he must bring a guilt offering, as will be stated. 6:11; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:1. Accordingly, when one says: "This produce is considered for me like a sin-offering" or "...like a guilt-offering," or he says: "It is a sin-offering" or "It is a guilt-offering," it is forbidden. Needless to say, if he says: "It is a burnt-offering," "...a peace-offering," "...a meal-offering," or "...a thanksgiving-offering," it is forbidden, for all of these offerings can be brought as vows or as donations.

If, however, one says: "This produce is considered for me like the challah [brought] to Aaron" or "...like the terumah for him," refers to a portion that must be separated from dough and given to a priest. Terumah refers to a portion of grain that must be separated and given to a priest. Since they may not be eaten by a non-priest, one might think that they could be the subject of a vow. Aaron is mentioned, because he is the progenitor of the priestly family. it is permitted. For there is no way that these can be brought as vows or as donations.

If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like the tithe-sacrifice of an animal," it is forbidden, for the sanctity [of the tithe-sacrifices] is conveyed upon them by mortals., for even before the terumah was separated, the grain was not permitted to be eaten, because it was tevel. The animals, by contrast, could have been slaughtered, before the tithe was separated (see Radbaz, quoting Rabbenu Asher). If he says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a firstborn," it is permitted, for the sanctity [of the firstborn] is not conveyed by mortals. It cannot be designated [for another sacred purpose] with a vow, as [Leviticus 27:26] states: "A man should not consecrate it." quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham who addresses the following question that was posed to him: The prooftext from Leviticus has been interpreted by the Sifri as teaching that a firstborn may not be consecrated as another sacrifice (see Hilchot Temurah 4:11 where the Rambam quotes this concept). Moreover, although the firstborn is intrinsically holy, it is a mitzvah to consecrate it for that sacrifice (quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Bechorot 1:5), and thus seemingly, the holiness is conveyed upon it by a mortal's actions.
Rav Avraham replies that since the holiness of the firstborn is inherent and it cannot be changed to that of another sacrifice, that is a proof that a vow cannot affect it. With regard to using a first born as the basis for a vow, see also Halachah 15 and notes.

If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a devotion offering for Above," 6:1 for a description of the nature of this pledge. it is forbidden, for the devotion offering for Above are [set aside] for improvements within the Temple.
[A vow takes effect and produce] becomes forbidden although the person did not mention a sacrifice [if he makes any of the following statements]: "[This produce] is considered for me like the donations for the chamber," refers to the money collected from the half-shekel donations collected from the Jewish people and used for the communal sacrifices offered in the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2. "...like the daily sacrifices," "...like the storage rooms," 1:3). "...like the wood," "...like the fire-offerings," "...like the altar," or "...like any of the utensils of the altar," e.g., he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like the altar rakes," "...like the ewers [for the blood of the sacrifices]," "...like the altar forks," or the like. [This law also applies] if he says: "This produce] is considered for me like the Temple," "...like Jerusalem." [The rationale is that] all of these statements are similar to saying: "[This produce] is considered for me like a sacrifice."

[When there was] sacrificial meat - even meat from a peace offering whose blood had been poured [on the altar] which is permitted to non-priests - before a person and he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like this meat," it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] he attached [his vow] to the fundamental element of the meat, and that was forbidden. 11b. Hence, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).
[Different rules apply if] the meat was from a firstborn sacrifice. If its blood had not been poured [on the altar], [the produce] is forbidden. 12b, the source for this halachah. This leads the Kessef Mishneh to conclude that there was a printing error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is "[the produce] is permitted." He states that he found an ancient text that reads this way. Similarly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read in that manner, omitting the last phrase entirely.
The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham defends the ruling in the existing text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining that there is a difference between a firstborn sacrifice and the meat of a firstborn sacrifice. If it had been poured, it is permitted.

There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.
What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban. Cherek, cheref, and cherech are all terms referring to a cherem (dedication offering).
Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We follow the language used by people at large in that place and at that time. 207:1) quotes opinions that maintain that this surely applies to vows made in gentile languages. And conversely, he also mentions views that maintain that if someone makes a vow using the wording of our Sages without understanding what he is saying, it does not take effect.

Just as a person can make a vow forbidding entities to himself with such terms, so, too, if he consecrates an entity with such terms, the entity is consecrated. Nicknames for such terms, 10b gives examples: miknamna, miknachna, and miknasna. however, are not binding (Yoreh De'ah 207:1)]. Kin'at Eliyahu states that apparently, they also would not have been recognized universally as having the desired intent. whether for vows involving prohibitions or vows involving the consecration of property.

If a person tells a colleague: "Whatever I eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food," "...will not be kosher," or "...will not be pure,". it is as if he told him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be like a sacrifice," (in which instance, his vow would not be binding), we follow the principle (Chapter 2, Halachah 7): Whenever there is a doubt concerning the effectiveness of a vow, we rule stringently (Rabbenu Nissim). which is forbidden. Similarly, if he tells him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be an impure [sacrifice]," "...notar," or piggul," it is forbidden.

When a person tells a colleague: "Not ordinary food will I not eat from your [property]," it is as if he told him: "What I will eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food, but instead, like a sacrifice." 11b).
Similarly, if he tells him: "The sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," or "Like a sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden [to eat from his property]. If, by contrast, he tells him: "The sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," "Like a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "For a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," or "Not a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted in all of these instances. For all of these expressions do not have any implication other than he is taking an oath by a sacrifice that he will not eat from his [property] and taking an oath on a sacrifice is not binding. Alternatively, [his intent can be interpreted] as taking a vow that he will not partake of a sacrifice with him.

[If he tells him:] "Ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Like ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat not with you," "Like ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," it is permitted for him [to eat from his property]. 11a, it would appear that some of these expressions would involve a vow. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's rulings.

If, by contrast, he says: "No impure [sacrifices] will I eat from your [property]," "No notar, will I eat from your [property]," or "No piggul will I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden. [The vow takes effect, because] the intent of his statements appears to be: "What I will eat will be piggul or impure. Therefore, I will not eat from your [property]." 10b, the Lechem Mishneh explains that we offer this interpretation, because we assume that a person will not make statements unnecessarily. Hence, since his statements could be interpreted as implying a vow, we offer such an interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh struggles with the meaning of the Rambam's words and suggests that perhaps an error crept into the text.

[If he says:] "By the Temple, I will eat from your [property]," "The Temple, I will eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will eat from your [property]," [the vow is effective, and] it is forbidden. "The Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," "Like the Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted. questions the Rambam's wording. For this is like taking an oath by the Temple, that he will not eat from his [property]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person tells a colleague, "I am taking a vow from you," his statement implies that he will not speak with him. "I am separate from you" implies that he will not do business with him. "I am distant from you" implies that he will not sit within four cubits of him. That same implication is conveyed by telling him: "I am ostracized from you" or "I am banned from you." 7:4).
The Turei Zahav 206:1 mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that these vows are not effective at all.
If, however, says "I am taking a vow from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," "I am separate from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," or "I am distant from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he is forbidden to eat from his [property]. 3a): "The handles of vows are as vows." The intent is that even a statement that, like a handle to a cup, is merely an auxiliary to a vow is binding like a vow itself. See also a responsum authored by the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which explains that even when the intent of one's statements are not entirely clear, as in the present instance, they may constitute a vow, provided their intent is somewhat clear. This principle is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:1). If he eats an olive-sized portion [of food] from any of his property, he is liable for lashes for [violating the prohibition]: "He shall not desecrate his word."

If he tells him: "I am ostracized from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he may not eat from his [property, but] if he does, he is not liable for lashes. 7a, it appears that this expression creates an unresolved question whether the one taking the vow was merely promising not to come within four cubits of the other person or whether he intended to forbid partaking of that person's property. Because of the doubt, he is forbidden to partake of the property, but is not given lashes. If he tells him: "I have drifted and nad which mean "wander" and "roam." Nevertheless, Nedarim 7a states that all authorities agree that this expression creates a binding commitment. from you," he is forbidden to benefit from him..

When a person tells a colleague: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked who make nazirite vows, vows for a sacrifice, and oaths, 1:1). The wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person (Halachah 2). See also Chapter 13, Halachah 25, which states that it is undesirable to make vows. if I eat from your [property]," should he eat [from his property], he is liable for all of the above..
Similarly, if he says: "Let it be considered for me like the pledges of the upright who make nazirite pledges and donations for a sacrifice, if I eat from your [property," should he eat from his property,] he is liable.

If one says: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked..." or "...like the pledges of the upright that I will eat from your [property]," or "...if I eat from your property," he is forbidden [to do so], even if he did not make an explicit statement.
If he said: "Like the vows of the upright," his statement is of no consequence, for the upright do not take vows to prohibit things out of anger. If he says: "I am like the vows of the wicked," and a nazirite was passing before him, he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow. If he says: "I am responsible, like the vows of the wicked," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice. "Like the vows of the wicked, I will not eat from it," (Yoreh De'ah 206:4)]. he is liable for an oath..

When a person takes a vow by the Torah, i.e., he says: "This produce is considered for me like this," his statements are of no consequence and he need not ask a sage to release him from it., ch. 6, which describe this practice. [An exception is made if] he is a common person so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows. 12:4-5.

If one took a vow by what was written in [the Torah], he is forbidden [to partake of the article mentioned in his vow], for [the Torah] contains statements involving prohibitions and vows. 1:3). With regard to oaths, by contrast, his intent is focused on God's name. If he took it in his arm and took an oath on it, it is as if he took a vow by what was written in it.

When a person tells a colleague: "Let's get up and study a chapter [of Torah]," he is obligated to get up and study. 8a derives this concept from Ezekiel 3:22-23 which states: "And He said to me: "Arise and go out to the valley and there I will speak to you. I arose and I went out to the valley and there the glory of God was standing." Since God promised to reveal Himself to Ezekiel, He kept his word, appearing even before Ezekiel arrived there. Even though he did not use the wording of a vow, this is comparable to a vow. 8a, it appears that although this statement establishes a binding commitment, it does not have the full power of a vow. The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 213:2) consider this statement as an actual vow.
The Rambam's perspective appears to be that a vow involves making an object forbidden. This instance where the person accepts a commitment upon himself bears a closer resemblance to the obligation incurred when making an oath. Nevertheless, since the person did not employ the wording associated with an oath, it is not binding as an oath. Nonetheless, since a mitzvah is involved, a binding commitment is established.

When a person tells his wife: "You are considered to me as my mother," "...as my sister," "...as orlah," or "...as mixed species in a vineyard," it is as if one says concerning produce: "May it be like pig meat." Just as he is permitted to partake of that produce, as explained, so, too, he is permitted [to engage in relations] with his wife.
If, however, he tells her: "I am taking a vow, forbidding all pleasure from you"or "The pleasure of relations with you is forbidden to me," she is forbidden to him, as will be explained.