הלכות שבועות

Whether one takes one of these four oaths [falsely] on his own initiative or he is placed under oath by another person and answers Amen to his statements, he is liable. to the statements is derived from the Torah's statements with regard to a sotah, a woman suspected of adultery (Numbers 5:22 . For she is required to answer Amen to the oath administered to her by the priest and yet, it is considered as if she took the oath herself. [This applies] even if he is placed under oath by a gentile 65a states that this oath was binding. Similarly, Sh'vuot 36a speaks of an oath Moses took to Jethro, his gentile father-in-law (Kessef Mishneh). or a minor and responds Amen.
[The rationale is that] anyone who responds Amen or makes a statement equivalent to responding Amen, e.g., he says "Yes," "I am obligated in this oath," "I accept this oath upon myself," or the like in any language, the Hebrew used in the Bible and by the Sages. is considered to have taken an oath with regard to all matter,. whether it be liability for lashes or takes an oath in vain. or for a sacrifice. or sh'vuat ha'edut.

[The same laws apply whether] one took an oath - or another person administered an oath to him - with God's ineffable name. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:7 which states that this term also refers to the name Adonai. The same law holds true for any other of God's names. - or with one of the descriptive terms used to refer to Him, 6:5, which states that even when these descriptions are used to refer to Him, they are not considered to have the same holiness as one of His names. e.g., he took an oath "on He whose name is Gracious," "on He whose name is Merciful," or "on He whose name is Patient," regardless of the language he used., the Hebrew used in the Bible and by the Sages. The statement is considered an oath in the full sense of the term. and the Radbaz who explains that there is a difference of opinion among the Rishonim if a sh'vuat bitui must contain God's name for one to be liable as appears to be the Rambam's opinion or whether His name need not be mentioned as is the view of the Ramban, Rabbenu Asher, and others. The Ra'avad takes an intermediate view, stating that one transgresses by taking a false oath and is liable to bring a sacrifice, but he is not liable for lashes unless he mentions one of God's names.
All authorities agree that God's name must be mentioned for one to be liable with regard to a sh'vuat haedut or a sh'vuat hapikadon. On that basis, the Radbaz supports the Rambam's position, asking why a differentiation should be made between one type of oath and another. See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 237:1) and commentaries.
Similarly, a statement with the terms eleh or erur is considered as an oath, 36a derives this concept from the verses cited above with regard to Tzidkayahu's oath, for there he used the term "curse." See also I Samuel 14, 24, 27 which indicate that saying that one will be cursed is equivalent to an oath. provided one mentions one of God's names or one of the terms used to describe Him. What is implied? When a person said: "May one who eats this-and-this entity be cursed unto God," or "...cursed unto He whose name is Gracious," "...cursed unto He whose name is Merciful" and then ate that entity, he has taken a false oath., as indicated by Chapter 1, Halachah 3. Similar concepts apply with regard to the other types of oaths.

Similarly, one who says: "[I am taking] an oath by God...," or "...by One whose name is Gracious that I will not eat," and he ate, "...that this is a woman," and it was a man, "...that I do not owe you anything," and he does, "that I do not know any testimony involving you," and he does, he is liable.

If a person uses the term eleh or erur or an oath and does not mention God's name or a term describing Him, he is bound by a prohibition with regard to the entity concerning which he [desired to] take the oath. He is not, however, liable for lashes or for a sacrifice if he violated his oath unless it included one of God's names 6:2 for a list of the seven names of God. or a term describing Him as explained.

Not only the term sh'vuah, but [the use of] any idiom used to refer to an oath is considered as [taking] an oath. For example, people in a given place were inarticulate and would call an oath shabutah or shakukah, or they were Aramites for whom the term for oath in their language is momata, and the inarticulate idiomatically refer to it is mohah. When a person makes a statement whose intent and meaning is that he is taking an oath, he is liable as if he used the term [in Lashon Hakodesh].

Similarly, when a person says: "No, no," repeating the negative twice as if he is taking an oath or "Yes, yes," and mentions God's name or a term used to describe Him, it is considered an oath. states that since the person mentioned God's name, seemingly, it is not necessary for him to repeat yes or no, the mention of His name alone should be sufficient for his statement to be considered an oath. He explains that we are speaking about an instance when God's name was not mentioned in direct connection with the statement. Nevertheless, the fact that he repeated no, or yes while mentioning God's name, albeit indirectly, is sufficient for his statements to be considered an oath. Similarly, if he says: "[By God's] right hand," it is an oath, or "[By God's] left hand," it is an oath, as [implied by Isaiah 62:5] "God swore by His right hand and by the arm of His strength." 3a states that "the arm of His strength" refers to His left arm. Otherwise, the verse would be redundant. Similarly, when someone says "Mivtah 20a notes that Numbers 30:7 understands this term as referring to an oath. that I will not do such-and-such," and mentions God's name or a term used to describe Him, it is considered an oath.

If he heard his colleague take an oath and said: "I am like him," he is not liable,, Rav Yosef Caro states that the Rambam's choice of wording - "He is not liable" rather than "It is permitted" - implies that although he is not liable, he is forbidden to break the commitment he made. Although other Rishonim differ, he follows this interpretation in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:9-10). See the following halachah. for he did not utter an oath, nor did his colleague administer an oath to him. This is "appending" to an oath for which one is not liable. 3:3-4.

Similarly, if he took an oath and said: "I will not eat this meat," and then said: "This bread is like this meat," he is not liable for the bread, because he did not explicitly take an oath regarding it. Instead, he appended [the prohibition concerning it to his existing oath]. Although he is exempt from lashes and from a sacrifice, he is forbidden to partake of the bread that he appended to his oath. - oath - and a neder - vow. When a person takes an oath, he places a prohibition upon his person - he is forbidden to perform the activity concerning which he took the oath. When he takes a vow, the article becomes forbidden for him. Hence, since he spoke about the article and not himself, one might think that his statement has no effect at all.

[Although] a person has the intent to take an oath and resolves in his heart not to eat on that day or not to drink and has the intent for that activity to be forbidden for him by oath, [if] he does not actually make such a statement, he is permitted [to eat or drink], as [implied by Leviticus 5:4]: "expressing with his lips." [Implied is that] a person who takes an oath is not liable until he explicitly states the matter the oath concerns with his lips.

Similarly, if he resolved within his heart to take an oath and erred and uttered a statement that did not fit the intent in his heart, [the activity] is permitted. 26b implies, one's heart and one's lips must be in concord.
What is implied? A person had the intent that he would not eat in Reuven's [home], but when he actually came to state the oath explicitly, he swore not to eat in [Shimon's] home. [In such a situation,] he is permitted to eat in Reuven's [home] for he did not explicitly [swear not to eat there]. [And he is permitted to eat] in Shimon's [home] for he did not have the intent [to prohibit that].

Similarly, with regard to the other types of oaths, one is not liable until his mouth and his heart are in concord., this sentence is the conclusion of the previous halachah. The present halachah begins: "Therefore..." Compare to Halachot 15-16. Therefore [the following law applies if] a person took an oath in our presence that he would not eat and ate. He was given a warning [before he ate] and he responded: "My intent was that I would not depart today. I had a slip of the tongue and mentioned eating although that was not my intent." 6:9). is not liable for lashes unless, before he eats, he admits in the presence of witnesses that [his intent in] taking the oath was [not] to eat. Alternatively, [he is liable for lashes] if he accepted the warning and did not protest that he erred at the time of the warning. Even though he protested afterwards, we do not pay attention to him. 12:2, to be liable for lashes, a transgressor must acknowledge the warning. Since, at that time, he did not mention the lack of concurrence between his intent and his statements, we assume that he is fabricating the matter. Similarly, [he is liable] if they warned him and he said: "I never took an oath - or a vow - concerning this matter." Despite the fact that after they give testimony that he took an oath or vow, he says: "Yes, that is true, but my mouth and heart were not in concord," or "In my heart, I had a stipulation in mind concerning the vow," we do not heed him and he is liable for lashes.

Similarly, if [witnesses] told him: "Your wife took a vow," and he said: "My intent was to nullify the vow and I did so," and made the statement nullifying his wife's vow in a hushed tone. If, however, he did not make a statement of hafarah at all, the vow is not nullified, as stated in Hilchot Nedarim 13:7). The Tzaphnat Paneach states that the intent is that he used the halachic convention of bittul. In such in instance, a statement need not be made (Hilchot Nedarim 13:4). we heed his statements. If he is told, "She took a vow," and he denies it, but when he saw them testify against him, he said: "My intent was to nullify [the vow]," his word is not heeded.

If he resolved within his heart not to partake of bread made from wheat, but took an oath not to partake of bread without qualifying his statement, he is forbidden to partake of bread from wheat. For when bread [is mentioned without qualification, the meaning] is bread from wheat.

When a person takes an oath, saying: "[I am taking] an oath that I will not eat today and my oath is dependent on your intent," he cannot [later] say: "I had these-and-these thoughts in my heart." [The rationale is] that the person did not take the oath dependent on his own intent, but rather on the intent of others. Since his statements did concur with the intent of those on whose intent he took the oath he is liable. [The intent in] the heart of those individuals takes the place of his own intent. [This concept also applies] with regard to other types of oaths.

[The following law applies when a person] took an oath and his statements and his intent concurred at the time he took the oath, but after he becomes forbidden [in the particular activity mentioned in the oath], he changes his mind immediately, directly after he spoke. [The latter term has a specific halachic definition]: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. [If, in this interim, the person says:] "This is not an oath," "I changed my mind," "I retract," or the like, i.e., statements that imply that he seeks to release the prohibition he took on [himself], it is permitted. 87a states that this principle applies with the exception of four situations: a blasphemer, one who accepts a false deity, one who consecrates a woman as a wife, and one who divorces her. Rabbenu Nissim explains that when taking an oath, a person has in mind that he might change his mind in this brief amount of time. Hence, his oath is not binding until this time passes. The oath is eradicated, for this resembles one who made a statement in error.

Similarly, if others tell him: "Retract," "It is permitted for you," or the like and he accepts their view within the above measure of time and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 210:3), Rav Yosef Caro and also the Radbaz explain that since the others protested immediately after his oath and his acceptance also came immediately afterwards, it is as if he never completed taking the oath. by saying: "Yes," or "I retract," he is permitted. After this measure of time, he cannot retract.

If a person took an oath and retracted within his heart within the above measure of time, it is of no consequence. Similarly, if others told him: "Retract," "It is permitted for you," or "It is absolved for you," and he accepted their words in his heart within the above measure of time, it is of no consequence. He must state his retraction explicitly like his oath.