הלכות נזירות

When a person takes a nazirite vow inadvertently, 25b). See Hilchot Nedarim 8:3 and Chapter 1, Halachah 15. is compelled to take one by forces beyond his control, 4:1. takes one in order to encourage a colleague, 4:3. or takes one while making exaggerated statements, 4:1; Hilchot Sh'vuot 3:5. he is exempt as is the law concerning other vows.
When a person takes a nazirite vow and regrets having taking it, he may approach a sage and ask him [to absolve it]. He may release his nazirite vow in the same way he releases other vows. 4:5.

[The following rules apply when a person] took a nazirite vow and went to brings his sacrifices for that vow with the intent that he will bring them on the completion of the days of his vow, but discovered that either all of the animals or one of them were stolen. If he took the nazirite vow before the animal was stolen, he is a nazirite. 8:5; Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:12. If he took the nazirite vow after [an animal] was stolen, lost, or died, he is not a nazirite. It is as if he took a nazirite vow in error. 8:3.

If a nazirite was passing before him and he said: "I am like him," he is a nazirite. If a colleague of his took a nazirite vow and he said: "My mouth is like his mouth with regard to wine" or "My hair is like his hair with regard to cutting it," he is a nazirite. Similarly, if he heard him [take a nazirite vow] and said: "And also I" immediately thereafter, (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17). [he is a nazirite]. And if a third person said: "And also I" immediately after the second person's statement - even if this continues for 100 individuals - they are all nazirites.

If a person says: "I will be a nazirite when a son will be born to me," and his colleague says: "And also I," his colleague becomes a nazirite immediately. 13a. The Ra'avad offers a different interpretation of the passage. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's understanding.

When a person tells a colleague: "I will be a nazirite when a son will be born to you," and his colleague says: "And also I," [his colleague does not become] a nazirite. [The rationale is that] the latter person only had the desire to say that he would love for a son to be born to him to the same degree as the first does. For he is embarrassed in his presence.

When a person says: "I will be a nazirite when a son will be born to so-and so," and his colleague heard his statement and said: "And also I," there is an unresolved question concerning the matter. Perhaps his colleague's intent was to become a nazirite like him 13a). or perhaps he wanted to say that he loved him like the other person did. When there is a question whether a nazirite vow takes effect, we rule leniently.

[A nazirite vow can take effect in the following situation.] Two people were walking on the road and saw another person approaching them. One of them said: "The person approaching us is Shimon." The other said: "He is Reuven." The first replied: "I will become a nazirite if it is Reuven" and the second responded: "I will become a nazirite if it is Shimon." If he reaches them and he is Reuven, [the first] is a nazirite. If it is Shimon, the second is a nazirite as per the vows. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If the person did not reach them, but instead turned backward and disappeared from their sight and they did not discover his identity, neither of them are nazirites.

[A nazirite vow can take effect in the following situation.] Two people were walking on the road and saw another person approaching them. One of them said: "The person approaching us is Shimon." The other said: "He is Reuven." The first replied: "I will become a nazirite if it is Reuven" and the second responded: "I will become a nazirite if it is Shimon." If he reaches them and he is Reuven, [the first] is a nazirite. If it is Shimon, the second is a nazirite as per the vows. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If the person did not reach them, but instead turned backward and disappeared from their sight and they did not discover his identity, neither of them are nazirites.

Similarly, when a person says: "I will be a nazirite if there will be 100 kor (Hilchot Arachin 4:4). in this grainheap," if when he goes to measure it, he discovers that [some of the produce] was stolen or lost, he is not a nazirite. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. [The rationale is that] When there is a question about whether a nazirite vow takes effect, we rule leniently.

All [of the people who took nazirite vow in the following situation] are nazirites. Several people] were walking on the road and saw a ko'i is a hybrid born from breeding a deer and a goat. There is an unresolved question among our Sages if it is considered as a domesticated animal (behemah) or a wild beast {(chayah) the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Bikkurim 2:8}. In Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 1:13, he states that the term refers to any hybrid that comes from mating a domesticated animal with a wild beast. from a distance. One said: "I will be a nazirite if that is a wild beast." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is a domesticated animal." Another said: 5:6), the Rambam states that if one person made all these statements, he is obligated to fulfill an equivalent number of nazirite vows. "I will be a nazirite if that is not a wild beast." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is not a domesticated animal." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is neither a wild beast, nor a domesticated animal." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if that is both a wild beast and a domesticated animal." [The rationale is that] in certain matters, a ko'i resembles a wild beast. In other matters, it resembles a domesticated animal. In still other matters, it resembles both a wild beast and a domesticated animal and in still other matters, it resembles neither a domesticated animal, nor a wild beast.
Similar laws apply if they saw an androgynus and argued whether the person was a man or a woman and took vows similar to those mentioned with regard to a ko'i. They are all nazirities, because there are matters in which an androgynus resembles a man, matters where the resemblance is to a woman, matters in which there is no resemblance to either a man or a woman, and matters in which there is a resemblance to both a man and a woman.

All of the above applies to the person's status with regard to the mitzvot and not with regard to his nature and physical characteristics. Similarly, the factors involving a ko'i apply with regard to the mitzvot and not with regard to its nature and physical characteristics.
What is implied? [When] a ko'i [is slaughtered, its] blood must be covered as the blood of a wild beast must. 14:4. Its fat is forbidden as is the fat of a domesticated animal. 1:13. It is considered a union of mixed species if it is mated with either a domesticated animal or a wild beast, 9:5. as if it were neither a wild beast or a domesticated animal. And it must be ritually slaughtered as is required for both a domesticated animal or a wild beast. Similarly, there are other halachic considerations that apply with regard to it and they will all be explained in their appropriate place. 12:8-9; Hilchot Bikkurim 9:5; 10:7; Hilchot Sha'ar Avot HaTumah 1:6, et al.
Similarly, an androgynus becomes impure because of a seminal emission like a man and because of uterine bleeding like a woman.. See Hilchot Mita'amei Mishkav UMoshav 1:7; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah 3:7. He cannot be sold as a Hebrew servant, [differing in this way] from both a man and a woman. 4:1. And a person who kills him is executed like one who kills either a man or a woman. There are also other laws applying to him. Each one will be stated in its place. 3:9; Hilchot Yibbum VeChalitzah 6:8; Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 22:11, et al.

Similar [laws apply] if [several people] saw a group of men approaching them which contained sighted people and blind people. One said: "I will be a nazirite if they are sighted people." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if they are not sighted people." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if they are blind." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if they are not blind." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if among them are sighted people and blind people." Another said: "I will be a nazirite if among them are those who are not sighted people and those who are not blind." Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a minor reaches the age when his vows are of consequence 11:1-4). and he takes a nazirite vow, he is a nazirite and must bring his sacrifices maintain that those authorities follow a minority position. even though he has not manifested signs of physical maturity, as he [must uphold] his other vows.
A father may administer a nazirite vow to his son who is underage even though he has not reached the age when his vows are of consequence. A woman, by contrast, may not administer a nazirite vow to her son. This is a concept conveyed by the Oral Tradition. It does not apply with regard to other vows.

What is implied? A father told his son who was a minor: "You are a nazirite"; he said: "My son, so-and-so, is a nazirite;" or he said, [pointing to his son,] "He is a nazirite," and the son remained silent, the son is a nazirite. The father must have him conduct himself according to all the particulars of the nazirite laws. If [the son] becomes impure, he must bring the sacrifices [associated with the termination] of impurity. When he completes his nazirite vow, he must bring the sacrifices [required when a nazirite vow is completed in] purity.

If the son did not desire this and objected to the matter, and the Radbaz refer to the difference of opinion between Rashi and Tosafot (Nazir 28b) whether the objection must be made immediately or whether they can be made throughout the span of the nazirite vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nazir 4:6), the Rambam espouses the view shared by Tosafot that once the son began observing the nazirite vow, he cannot object to it. his relatives objected, (mitzvah 368) writes that if the child agrees to observe the nazirite vow, it is binding even if the relatives object. he cut off his hair, or his relatives cut off his hair - thus performing a deed that indicates that either he or his relatives did not desire the nazirite vow, who debates whether drinking wine is also considered a deed which registers the son's objections. he is not a nazirite. Until when may his father administer a nazirite vow to him? Until he attains majority, 2:2; see the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.). and becomes an adult.

The concept of a nazirite vow does apply to women and servants. 62b explains how this concept can be explained by Biblical exegesis. A father or a husband may nullify a nazirite vow taken by a woman if he so desires as is the case with regard to other vows., chs. 11-13. With regard to a servant, [to nullify his nazirite vow,] his master must compel him to drink [wine] or become impure due to contact with the dead. If he does not compel him, he must observe the nazirite vow.

When a servant takes other vows that involve personal aggravation or that prevent his performance of work or makes a valuation assessment, 1:2. his master does not have to compel him [to act against the vow to nullify it]. [The rationale is that the servant] is not the owner of his self and he cannot cause a vow to take effect regarding his person. To what can the matter be compared? To a person who [takes a vow] forbidding produce belonging to another person to the owner of that produce. 62b) , there are four different rulings with regard to vows or oaths a servant takes:
a) All oaths and valuation assessments that a servant takes are nullified automatically. The rationale is that "his body is not his property so that the oath he takes will be effective. With regard to oaths, [Numbers 30:3] states: 'forbid something upon one's soul.' [Implied is that the verse applies to] someone whose soul is his property. It excludes a servant who is someone else's property" (Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:6).
b) Vows other than a nazirite vow that are either aggravating or prevent the servant from working are automatically nullified. The rationale is that, with regard to an oath, Leviticus 5:4 states: "Whether he will do harm or do good." Implied is that he can take an oath - or a vow, because an association is established between vows and oaths - only when he has the choice of either doing good or doing harm to himself. This does not apply to these oaths. Since they harm his master, he has no right to take them.
c) Nazirite vows are not automatically nullified, because the association with vows does not apply with regard to them. Nevertheless, since the servant belongs to his master, the master has the right to nullify his vow.
d) Vows other than a nazirite vow that are neither aggravating nor prevent the servant from working must be fulfilled. The rationale is that in contrast to an oath in which the prohibition is incumbent on the servant (the gavra), for a vow, the prohibition falls upon the object (the cheftza). Since there is no harm to the master involved, such vows can take effect.
If, however, a vow does not involve personal aggravation and it is not a matter which holds back work, [the master] cannot compel him [not to observe it].
If a servant took a nazirite vow and his master told him: "It is nullified for you," [when] he receives his freedom, 8:17.
Based on a different version of Nazir 62b, the Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and does not agree that verbally nullifying a servant's vow is an indication that he must be freed. The commentaries support the Rambam's understanding. he is obligated to complete his nazirite vow. [The rationale is that] a servant must be compelled to nullify his vow. We do not nullify it verbally. If one nullifies it verbally, he is granted his freedom.

When a servant took a nazirite vow and fled from or abandoned his master, he is forbidden to drink wine. [This measure was enacted so that] he would suffer difficulty and return to his master's domain. 9:1 mentions that this issue is the subject of a difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yossi. Generally, in such instances, the halachah follows Rabbi Yossi and yet the Rambam follows Rabbi Meir's view. The Radbaz explains that the fact that Nazir 61a concludes by mentioning Rabbi Meir's view indicates that the halachah follows his opinion. The Kessef Mishneh suggests (- this, however, is not borne out by the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah -) that the Rambam's text of the mishnah read opposite to the standard version. Others support the Rambam's ruling, based on Tosafot who states that the halachah follows Rabbi Meir with regard to his decrees.
If he took a nazirite vow, completed it, and shaved, without his master knowing of this, and afterwards, was granted his freedom, he is considered to have satisfied the requirements of his nazirite vow. If, however, he took a nazirite vow, but did not shave, and was granted his freedom, he is not considered to have fulfilled his nazirite vow. If he became impure and then was granted his freedom, he must begin reckoning [the days of his nazirite vow] from the time he became impure.

Nazirite vows must be observed both while the Temple is standing and while the Temple was not standing. Therefore when a person takes a nazirite vow in the present era, he must observe it forever, because we do not have a Temple where he can go and offer his sacrifices at the conclusion of his nazirite vow.

A nazirite vow may be observed only in Eretz Yisrael. 54a; see Hilchot Tuma'at Meit 11:1). When a person takes a nazirite vow in the Diaspora, he is penalized and obligated to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and observe his nazirite vow there for as long as he vowed. 19b, 20a relates that Queen Heleni took a vow that if her son would return safe from a war, she would be a nazarite for seven years. She observed her vow and came to the Temple to offer her sacrifices. The School of Hillel ruled that she should remain in Eretz Yisrael and observe her vow for another seven years, for the time she observed it in the Diaspora was not counted. Accordingly, when a person takes a nazirite vow in the Diaspora in the present era, we compel him to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and observe his nazirite vow there in the present era. We are all impure because of contact with a human corpse (or impurity that results from that) and there are no ashes from the red heifer to purify ourselves. If so, what difference is there between Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora? In neither place, will one be able to complete his nazirite vow in purity. Hence, the Ra'avad concludes, it is forbidden to take a nazirite vow in the present age, whether in the Diaspora or in Eretz Yisrael.
The Radbaz states that although we are ritually impure, abiding in the Diaspora increases that impurity. Hence, it is preferable for one who takes a nazirite vow to ascend to Eretz Yisrael. The Kessef Mishneh goes further and states that since a person can prevent himself from coming into contact with the ritual impurity associated with a corpse, there is no prohibition against taking a nazirite vow in the present age. until he dies or until the Temple is built and he brings his sacrifices there at the conclusion of the span of his vow.

Throughout the entire time he is in the Diaspora, he is forbidden to drink wine, to become impure due to contact with the dead, and to cut his hair. He must uphold all of the requirements stemming from a nazirite vow, despite the fact that the days are not counted for him. If he transgressed and drank [wine], cut his hair, or touched a corpse or the like, he is liable for lashes.