הלכות ערכים וחרמין

Whether a person says: 'This is consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple,' 'This is a dedication offering implies the removal of an entity from one framework of reference and its inclusion in another. Similarly, in this instance, the property is being taken from the realm of private, personal possessions and being sanctified (see the gloss of HaKtav VeHaKabalah to Leviticus 27:29 . It must, however, be emphasized that the term cherem has negative connotations, meaning 'a ban' and the root has the connotation 'absolute destruction.' In that context, in his Living Torah, Rav Aryeh Kaplan interprets the term is meaning 'declare taboo,' i.e., banned from ordinary mortal use and hence, designated for the Temple treasury or the priests. for the sake of improvements to the Temple,' or 'This is a dedication offering for the sake of Heaven,' or he [makes] similar [statements] with regard to his property as a whole, saying that it is all consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple, as a dedication offering for the sake of improvements to the Temple, or as a dedication offering for the sake of Heaven, [the property] should be given for improvements to the Temple. If, however, he said [that the property should be given] as a dedication offering without making any specifications, it should be given to the priests, for unspecified dedication offerings are given to the priests, questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages (Arachin 28b) and it appears that the conclusion of the Talmud is that if no specification is made, dedication offerings should be given for improvements to the Temple. Indeed, Rashi (Beitzah 36b) and others rule in this manner. The Or Sameach suggests that the Rambam's source is Ezekiel 44:29 which states: 'All the dedication offerings from the Jewish people shall be yours.' as [Numbers 18:14] states: 'All of the dedication offerings from the Jewish people will be yours.

A person may make a dedication offering from his cattle, his sheep, his Canaanite servants and maid-servants, and his ancestral fields. (positive commandment 145) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 357) include the laws governing dedication offerings among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. He should not, however, designate all of his cattle, all of his servants, all of his fields, nor all of any type of movable property that he owns as a dedication offering, as [implied by Leviticus 27:28]: 'From everything that he owns.' If he gives all he owns from a particular type of property as a dedication offering, even if he gives everything he owns as a dedication offering, his gift is binding. [This applies] whether he designates the dedication offering for the priests or for the improvement of the Temple.

When a person gives all of his property as a dedication offering or consecrates it, we take everything that he owns, even the tefillin on his head. Needless to say, [this includes] his tools and his clothes, who is allowed to retain ownership of his basic necessities, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachot 14-17. for he consecrated or gave as a dedication offering all of his possessions.

What is the difference between dedication offerings designated for priests and those dedicated to Heaven? Dedication offerings to Heaven become consecrated property and must be redeemed for their worth. The payment is given for the sake of improvements to the Temple and then the possessions become ordinary property. Dedication offerings designated for the priests, by contrast, can never be redeemed. Instead, they are given to the priests like terumah. Concerning dedication offerings designated for the priests, [Leviticus 27:28] states: 'It shall neither be sold, nor redeemed,' (negative commandments 110-111) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvot 358-359) include both the prohibitions against selling and redeeming property designated as a dedication offering among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. i.e., it shall neither be sold to another person,, but the version of the standard text of the Sifra speaks of a prohibition against selling the property to the Temple treasurer. There are those who maintain that the Rambam followed a version of the Sifra with a different reading. Significantly, however, in his Sefer HaMitzvot (loc. cit.), the Rambam defines the prohibition as forbidding the sale to the Temple treasurer. nor redeemed by the owner.

Whether a person designates land or movable property as a dedication offering, it is given to a priest, the donor has the right to give the dedication offering to the priest of his choice from the watch. It is not divided among all the priests of the watch. See Arachin 28a. in the watch serving at the time that the dedication offering was designated.
As long as a dedication offering for the priests is in the homes of the owner, it is like consecrated property in all regards,, misappropriating consecrated property, applies. as [Leviticus 27:28] states: 'All dedication offerings are consecrated as holy unto God.' Once it is given to the priests, it is considered as ordinary property, as [Numbers 18:14] states: 'All of the dedication offerings from the Jewish people will be yours.'

If a priest has a field that was a dedication offering [or an ancestral field]. The version of the standard published text (which reflects that of authentic manuscripts and early printings) would be literally translated as 'When a priest possesses a field that was designated as a dedication offering which he acquired after the Jubilee.' We prefer the version of the Kiryat Sefer, because there is no connection between the Jubilee year and a priest's acquisition of dedication offerings. that he acquired after the Jubilee and he designates it as a dedication offering, it is considered as a dedication offering and should be given to his brethren, the priests, as [implied by Leviticus 27:21], 'It will become the priest's, [like his] ancestral property.' This teaches that a field [designated] as a dedication offering that [a priest acquires] is like an ancestral field owned by an Israelite. If he designates it as a dedication offering, it becomes sanctified immediately.

When a priest sells a field that he [had acquired after it was designated as] a dedication offering and then the purchaser consecrates it - even if the purchaser was the original owner who designated it as a dedication offering - it is like [the consecration of] acquired property and it returns to the priest who sold it in the Jubilee year.
Land or movable property that belongs to the priests or the Levites, 8:5) indicates that he favored the view that maintains that this only applies to priests. Rav Kapach maintains that this is an error and his ruling there is - as stated here - that it applies to both priests and Levites. by contrast, may not be designated as a dedication offering. [The rationale is that] with regard to the fields [granted to them, Leviticus 25:34] states: 'For it is an eternal inheritance for them,' 28a).
Thus there is obviously a difference between land or movable property that belongs to a priest and property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering, as stated in Halachah 6. The rationale is that property that a priest owns as an ancestral heritage is essentially his. On the other hand, property that he acquired because it was designated as a dedication offering is not essentially his. Hence, it can be given to other priests as a dedication offering. and an association is established between movable property and land with regard to dedication offerings, as [Leviticus 27:28] states: 'from anything he owns... and from his ancestral field."

When a person consecrates [animals that] had been consecrated [to be offered] on the altar for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the [second] consecration is of consequence. The animal should be evaluated and redeemed and its worth given for the sake of improvements to the Temple. [Afterwards,] it should be offered for the purpose for which it was originally consecrated.
When, however, a person consecrates [animals that] had been consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple [with the intent that they be offered] on the altar, saying: 'This is a burnt offering,' or '...a peace offering,' or he designates them as a dedication offering to the priests, his act is of no consequence. (Temurah 32a) explains the difference between the two instances as follows: The owner of an animal consecrated as a sacrifice still shares a connection to it. For if it is blemished, he must redeem it and replace it. In contrast, once an animal is consecrated to the Temple treasury, it leaves the owner's domain entirely. For [animals that] had been consecrated for the sake of improvements to the Temple cannot be consecrated [to be offered] on the altar or designated as dedication offerings, because a person cannot consecrate an entity that does not belong to him.

When a person says: 'This ox will be consecrated after 30 days' and slaughters it within the 30 days, it is permitted to benefit from it. notes that the Rambam's apparent source, the Tosefta (Temurah 3:1), states that it is permitted to partake of the animal that was slaughtered and questions why the Rambam does not rule accordingly. He explains that the Rambam considers the person who consecrated the animal equivalent to an apostate for by slaughtering the animal, he prevents his vow from being fulfilled. As stated in Hilchot Shechitah 4:14, there are certain conditions necessary for slaughter performed by such a person to be successful. If he consecrated it to the altar, it is consecrated to the altar.
If, by contrast, he says: "This animal is consecrated immediately after 30 days," and he slaughters it within those 30 days, it is forbidden to benefit from it.). If he consecrated it to the altar within the 30 days, the consecration does not take effect.

When a person consecrates [an animal designated as] a burnt offering for the sake of improvements to the Temple, only [its evaluation by] the Temple treasurers holds back [its slaughter]. According to Rabbinic decree, however, it should not be slaughtered until it is redeemed. Therefore, if he transgressed and slaughtered it [before it was redeemed], it is acceptable. 32a,b) states that in such an instance, the person is not required to pay anything for the dedication offering, because the animal was never evaluated.

A person may designate [animals consecrated as] sacrifices of the highest degree of sanctity or as sacrifices of a lesser degree of sanctity as dedication offerings - both as those set aside for the priests or for improvements to the Temple. If he was liable to replace these sacrifices, he must pay their value whether to the priests or for the sake of improvements to the Temple. After they are redeemed, he should then offer the sacrifices for their original purposes.

What is the redemption process [when a person] vowed [to bring a particular animal as a sacrifice] and then designated it as a dedication offering? We evaluate how much a person would be willing to give for the right of sacrificing this animal as a burnt offering even though he is not liable to do so. Whoever gives this amount may offer this animal [for the sacrifice] for which it was originally pledged.

When an Israelite designates a firstborn animal - whether unblemished or blemished - as a dedication offering for the sake of heaven, the designation takes effect. Needless to say, if the priest designates it as a dedication offering for the sake of heaven after it enters his domain, [the designation takes effect]. 1:3. Hence, there is no question that he has the right to do as he pleases with it.

How is it to be redeemed? We evaluate how much a person would be willing to give for the right for this firstborn to be his so that he will have the right to give it to whichever priest he desires, to his relative or his friend. Whoever gives this amount may take the firstborn and give it to whichever priest he desires. The money is given for the sake of improvements to the Temple.

When a person designates an animal selected as a tithe offering, ch. 6, for a description of this offering. as a dedication offering, it is as if he designated an animal pledged to be sacrificed as a peace offering. [The rationale is that] he is not liable to replace it.

When a person consecrates his [half-]shekel every male is required to give to purchase his share of the communal offerings. See Hilchot Shekalim, chs. 1-3. for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration is binding. If one consecrates bikkurim, chs. 1-4. for the sake of improvements to the Temple, the consecration does not take effect. are not his, but rather the property of the priest. If, however, the priest [to whom the bikkurim are given] consecrates them after they enter his domain, the consecration is binding. become the priest's private property (ibid. 4:14). Hence he may do with them whatever he desires.

When a person designates half of his servant or half of his maid-servant as a dedication offering, he and the priests are joint owners. If, however, he consecrates half his servant and designates half his servant as a dedication offering to Heaven, he is consecrated entirely, as we explained. Whenever one consecrates his Canaanite servant or maid-servant or consecrates all of his property and he owns servants, their physical person becomes consecrated Therefore it is forbidden to benefit from them, misappropriating sacred property, do not apply. See Hilchot Meilah 5:10. until they are redeemed.

When one consecrates his servant's hands, anything he earns beyond what is required for his sustenance is consecrated. 9:7). Hence that money must be taken from the servant's earnings. Nevertheless, since his earnings are consecrated, the process the Rambam continues to explain should be followed.
How should this servant sustain himself? He should borrow the money [required for his sustenance], work, and repay the debt. [This is allowed] provided he always works for less than a p'rutah and pays it. For if he earned an entire p'rutah, it would be acquired by the Temple treasury as soon as he earned it. 12b, explains that even a sum less than a p'rutah can be consecrated. (See Hilchot Meilah 7:8.) Nevertheless, the owner had the intent that this amount not be consecrated so that the servant would be able to sustain himself.

When a person consecrates himself, he consecrated only his worth. He is obligated to give [that amount to the Temple treasury]. He may earn money and [use it for] his sustenance, for his physical person did not become consecrated as that of a servant does.

A person cannot consecrate an entity that does not belong to him. 69b derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:14: "When a person will consecrate his house." Just as his house is his own, so too, everything he consecrates must be his own.
What is implied? If he designates his son, his daughter, his Hebrew servant, or Hebrew maid-servant, or a field he acquired as a dedication offering, they do not become dedication offerings. For a person cannot consecrate an entity when its physical person or substance is not his. 28a). Similarly, a field that one acquires is never totally his, for he must return it to its original owners in the Jubilee.

A person may not consecrate an entity that is not in his domain.
What is implied? A person entrusted an article to a colleague and the latter denied possession of it, the owners cannot consecrate it. If, however, [the watchman] did not deny possession of it, it is considered in its owner's domain, no matter where it is located.

When does the above apply? With regard to movable property. [Different rules apply] to landed property that was stolen and [the thief] denied [having taken it]. If [the original owner] could have the land expropriated through legal process, he has the right to consecrate it even though he has not yet expropriated it. For the land itself is always considered in the domain of its [legitimate] owners. 7a.

When a person steals from his colleague and the [original] owner does not despair [of recovery], 5:7. neither of them can consecrate it. [The robber cannot,] because the article does not belong to him and [the owner cannot,] because it is not in his possession. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

[The following laws apply when] a person was selling squash, eggs, or the like and a [prospective] purchaser comes, takes one, and then departs. If the price of each particular article is fixed, it is as if a price was established, and the seller cannot consecrate this squash, for it is not in his domain. If the price is not fixed and he consecrated it, it is consecrated, because it is still in his domain, 88a mentions this instance and from it, the law stated in Halachah 22 is derived. for [the prospective purchaser] did not take it with the intent to steal it.

A person cannot consecrate an article that has not yet come into existence. explains the rationale for this ruling: Since the object has not come into existence as of yet, it is not in his domain. And, as stated in Halachah 22, a person cannot consecrate an article that is not in his domain.
What is implied? [If a person says:] "What my net will bring up from the sea is consecrated" or "The fruit my field will produce is designated as a dedication offering," his words are of no consequence.

When a person tells a colleague: "When I repurchase this field which I sold you, 58b) emphasize that even though the person originally and ultimately owned the field, since he did not own it at the time he consecrated it, the consecration is not effective. it is consecrated," [although] he repurchases it, it is not consecrated. [The rationale is] that it was not in his possession when he consecrated it. 258:15 emphasizes that his statement is not even considered a vow, because the wording used does not have the implication of a vow. See Halachah 31 which speaks of this issue. Note, however, the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Mechirah 22:15.

Similarly, when a person consecrates the work to be produced by his wife's hands, she may work and partake [of her earnings]. The remainder is not consecrated. If he tells her: "May your hands be consecrated to their Maker," since they are under lien to him, 12:3, all of the proceeds of the work a woman performs belong to her husband. [the profits of] all of the work that she produces are consecrated. To what can this be compared? To one who says: "This tree is consecrated," in which instance all the fruit it produces is consecrated. (Even HaEzer 81:1) follows the Rambam's view, while the Rama quotes that of Rabbenu Nissim. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

When a person tells a colleague: "The field that I will sell you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you," the consecration takes effect when he buys it back. [The rationale is that] it is in his possession [originally] and he has the possibility of consecrating it.
[If one tells a colleague:] "The field that I entrusted to you as security will be consecrated when I redeem it from you," the field becomes consecrated when he redeems it. [The rationale is that] he has the potential to redeem it. [The consecration is effective] even if it was given as a security for a fixed time, because he has the potential to redeem it after that time.

[Although a person] rents out a house to a colleague, if he retracts and consecrates it, the consecration is effective and the rental arrangement is terminated. If the tenant dwells there, he violates the prohibition against misappropriating sacred property. 21a).

It appears to me that even though a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not come into being, if he says: "I pledge to consecrate it," he is obligated to consecrate it when it will come into being to [fulfill] his vow. If he does not consecrate it, he transgresses [the prohibitions]: "Do not delay in paying it" and "He shall not desecrate his word" and [fails to fulfill the positive commandment:] "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth" as is true with regard to all other vows. 1:4-5, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:13.

What is implied? [When a person] says: "I pledge to consecrate everything that my net will bring up from the sea," "I pledge to give the fruit produced by this field to the poor," "I pledge to designate as a dedication offering - or give for the sake of captives - all of my earnings of this year," or makes any statement of this like, he is obligated to give and/or perform what he pledged when the article comes into his possession. For these and all similar statements are vows, not acts of consecration. 22:15. On his notes to that source, the Ra'avad differs and maintains that for the statement to be considered a pledge, it must be worded in that matter. See Shulchan Aruch and Rama (Choshen Mishpat 212:7).

Support for this can be drawn from the statements of Jacob our Patriarch [Genesis 28:22]: "And everything that You will give me, I will tithe." And [later, ibid. 31:13]. states: "Where you took a vow." And when a person says: "I will not depart from this world until I become a nazirite," he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow 1:4 which states that he must observe the nazirite restrictions immediately, because he does not know how long he will live and he is required to fulfill his pledge before he dies.
The Ra'avad accepts the support from Jacob's statement, but not that from the nazirite's pledge, bringing two objections:
a) at present, it is within his potential to carry out the nazirite vow. Hence, the comparison to an entity that has not yet come into existence is not appropriate.
b) Since the person does not know when he will die, it is as if he has committed himself to observe the vow immediately. The Radbaz brings support for the Rambam's position. although he did not actually take such a vow. Since he said that he would take a nazirite vow, he is obligated to observe those restrictions. This law parallels that. It is appropriate to rule in this manner.

A consecration that is made in error is not binding. 8:3).
What is implied? If one says: "When a black ox will go out of the building first, it will be consecrated," should a white ox go out [first], it is not consecrated. [If he says:] "When a gold dinar comes into my hand first, it is consecrated," should a silver [dinar] come up, it is not consecrated. [If he says:] "When a barrel of wine comes into my hand first, it is consecrated," should a barrel of oil come up, it is not consecrated. [This applies] whether wine is more expensive than oil in that place or oil is more expensive than wine.
If he attempts to extend the consecration to a second entity, saying: "[The status of] this is the same as [that of] the other," the second is consecrated. explains that this clause is referring to a different concept entirely. If he had an article that was consecrated and extended its holiness to another article unintentionally, that article is consecrated. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.